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Parties to Offences under the Canadian Crimes 
against Humanity and War Crimes Act : 
an Analysis of Principal Liability and Complicity
Fannie laFontaine*
The Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act presents an inter-
esting mosaic of law applicable to the domestic prosecution of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. The definitions of offences refer 
essentially to international law, whereas the available defences, justifi-
cations and excuses are those of both Canadian law and international 
law, and the modes of participation in offences are exclusively those of 
Canadian law. This raises the question of the relevance and effective-
ness of the legislative choice to apply domestic law to the principles of 
liability for international crimes. The present study offers a preliminary 
and limited analysis of certain modes of participation in offences provided 
for by the Act, namely perpetration and complicity pursuant to section 
21 of the Criminal Code. This analysis aims at assessing, in light of the 
principles developed in international criminal law with respect to indi-
vidual responsibility, whether and how Canadian law may be adapted to 
the particular — collective — nature of international crimes.
La Loi sur les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre 
présente une mosaïque intéressante en ce qui concerne le droit applicable 
aux poursuites des crimes de génocide, crimes contre l’humanité et crimes 
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de guerre devant les tribunaux canadiens. Les définitions qu’elle offre 
des infractions se réfèrent essentiellement au droit international, tandis 
que les moyens de défenses disponibles sont ceux du droit canadien et du 
droit international, et que les modes de participation aux infractions sont 
exclusivement ceux prévus par le droit pénal canadien. Ce dernier aspect 
soulève la question de la pertinence et de l’utilité effective de ce choix du 
législateur de fonder sur le droit national les principes de responsabilité 
pénale individuelle pour des crimes internationaux. La présente étude 
offre une ébauche d’analyse de certains des modes de participation aux 
infractions prévus par la Loi, soit la commission et la complicité de l’ar-
ticle 21 du Code criminel. Cette analyse vise à évaluer, à la lumière des 
principes développés en droit international pénal relatifs à la responsabi-
lité individuelle, si ou comment ces principes de droit canadien pourront 
s’adapter à la nature particulière — collective — des crimes internationaux.
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The Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act1 was adopted to 
fulfil two main objectives : 1) to implement Canada’s obligations under 
 1. Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24 [hereinafter “War Crimes 
Act”].
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the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court2 in order to ensure 
its ability to cooperate fully with investigations and prosecutions by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) ; and 2) to retain and enhance Canada’s 
capacity to prosecute and punish persons accused of the “core” interna­
tional crimes, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes3. 
At the heart of the system put in place by the ICC to ensure account­
ability for these crimes lies the principle of complementarity. States bear 
the primary responsibility to prosecute those responsible for international 
crimes. The ICC will exercise its jurisdiction only if the competent State 
is “unable” or “unwilling” to do so4.
The criminalisation of core international crimes in domestic criminal 
legal systems is therefore essential for the success of the ICC and, more 
broadly, of the international criminal justice enterprise. The Rome Statute 
has spurred an effort by State parties to enact implementing legislation for 
such purpose, as well as to facilitate cooperation with the international 
body. Canada was one of the first States to adopt such legislation5. The 
War Crimes Act’s provisions with respect to jurisdiction, which provide for 
universal jurisdiction, as well as those regarding the substantive definitions 
of crimes, general principles of liability and available defences, are central 
for the fulfilment of the second objective cited above, namely the strength­
ening of Canada’s ability to prosecute the core international crimes. With 
respect to these various aspects, the Act presents an interesting mosaic of 
applicable law. Its definitions regarding offences refer essentially to inter­
national law, whereas the available defences, justifications and excuses 
are those of both Canadian law and international law, and the modes of 
participation in offences are exclusively those of Canadian law. 
Without a doubt, principles of liability are fundamental in determining 
the criminal responsibility of a person. In this regard, contrary to the legis­
lation of other states6, the Canadian War Crimes Act does not rely on 
 2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, UN 
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (entered into force 1 July 2002) [hereinafter “Rome Statute”].
 3. See e.g. canaDa, ParliaMent, Bill C-19 : Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
Act by David Goetz, LS­360E, Law and Government Division, 5 April 2000, revised 
15 June 2000, Part C “Ensuring Cooperation with the ICC”, [Online], [www.parl.
gc.ca/36/2/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/summaries/c19­e.htm] (26 September 2009).
 4. Art. 17, art. 1 and preambular par. 6 of the Rome Statute, supra, note 2.
 5. The War Crimes Act was adopted on 24 June 2000. Canada ratified the Rome Statute a 
few days later on 9 July 2000.
 6. See e.g. New Zealand’s International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000 
(N.Z.), 2000/26, s. 12, which incorporates art. 25 (3) of the Rome Statute and also clari­
fies that in the event of a conflict with New Zealand law (art. 66 of the Crimes Act 1961 
(N.Z.), 1961/43, provides for modes of criminal liability), art. 25 (3) of the Rome Statute 
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international law and does not, at least explicitly, allow judges to base them­
selves upon international law principles in the event that domestic ones are 
inadequate or insufficient to capture the essence of international crimes. 
The present study aims at offering a preliminary assessment — though 
limited in scope — as to whether this legislative choice is likely to create 
difficulties in prosecutions under the Act or unjustifiable incoherence with 
international law.
The issue of individual criminal responsibility is quite controversial in 
both the practice and theory of international criminal law. Stefano Mana­
corda notes the following :
Traditionally, the difficulty in attributing criminal behaviour (as defined in inter­
national criminal law) to individuals derives from the fact that classical criminal 
law categories are built on a “mononuclear” paradigm (one author, one fact, one 
victim). Such categories therefore seem largely inapplicable to macrocriminality. 
Oversimplifying, one could say that “individual” criminal responsibility, as a 
principle, is inadequate for explaining “collective” criminality7.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
recognised in its early jurisprudence that international crimes “constitute 
manifestations of collective criminality [and that] the participation and 
contribution of the other members of the group is often vital in facilitating 
the commission of the offence in question8”. Individual culpability does 
not diminish with distance from the actual acts committed against specific 
victims. The reverse is often true. Adolf Hitler, Adolf Eichmann and the 
likes never laid a hand on their victims, but sent millions to their deaths9. 
Blameworthiness often increases “in tandem” with the distance separating 
the mastermind from the direct perpetrator10.
Article 25 of the Rome Statute now contains detailed rules of indi­
vidual criminal responsibility, a positive development from earlier codifica­
tions whose rules governing participation in offences tended to be sketchy 
and archaic. At Nuremberg, the description of modes of liability was quite 
will prevail.
 7. Stefano ManacorDa, “Foreword” to the Symposium The Principles of Individual 
Criminal Responsibility : A Conceptual Framework, (2007) 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 913, 913.
 8. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case no IT­94­1­A, Judgement, 15 July 1999, par. 191 (ICTY – 
Appeals Chamber) [hereinafter “Tadić Appeal”].
 9. See Gerhard Werle, “Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute”, 
(2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 953, 954.
10. Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 
30 September 2008, Doc. off. ICC­01/04­01/07­717 (01­10­2008), par. 503 (Pre­Trial 
Chamber I).
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basic11. The ad hoc tribunals could rely on somewhat more detailed statu­
tory provisions12, and they progressively adopted rules aimed at capturing 
the collective nature of international crimes, notably through the (contro­
versial) doctrine of joint criminal enterprise.
A comparative assessment of Canadian law and international criminal 
law, as codified in the Rome Statute and as interpreted by the interna­
tional tribunals, is highly relevant. Differences between the two sets of 
principles, or gaps in either, could potentially lead to admissibility issues 
before the ICC or at least create inconsistency in the scope of responsi­
bility for the same crimes, depending on whether they are prosecuted in 
Canadian courts, or before the ICC or other international jurisdictions. 
For instance, if Canadian law was found not to contemplate a principle 
of liability encompassed by the Rome Statute, or to provide for one more 
limited in scope, Canada could find itself unable to prosecute in its domestic 
courts a person who would be punishable by the ICC for the same acts, 
thereby opening the door to a finding of admissibility of the case before the 
international body13. Moreover, if Canadian law was found to be broader 
than the Rome Statute, by allowing the prosecution of a participant in an 
offence that could not be prosecuted pursuant to the Rome Statute or under 
customary international law, this could potentially violate the principle 
of legality in cases of retroactive prosecutions or the Canadian courts 
be said to lack a basis in international law for the exercise of universal 
11. Art. 6 (a) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945, (1945) 82 
U.N.T.S. 279, provided that “participation in a common plan or conspiracy” to wage a 
war of aggression was a crime ; art. 6 (c) in fine read : “Leaders, organizers, instigators 
and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed 
by any persons in execution of such plan.”
12. Art. 7 (1) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 48th sess., 3217th Mtg., 32 ILM 1159 (1993) [herein­
after “ICTY Statute”], provides : “A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed 
or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime 
referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible 
for the crime.” Also see art. 6 (1) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 49th sess., 3454th Mtg., 33 ILM 1598 (1994) 
[hereinafter “ICTR Statute”].
13. On particular issue, see Bruce BrooMHall, International Justice & the International 
Criminal Court. Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2003, p. 92. Of course, the extent to which the ICC will allow a “margin of appre­
ciation” to States in the way they implement the substantive offences and other legal 
principles of the Rome Statute remains to be seen : Id., p. 92­93.
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jurisdiction14. Finally, principles that were developed in international crim­
inal law regarding liability have taken into account the particular nature 
of international crimes. Some forms of liability indeed allow persons who 
would be treated as accomplices under domestic principles to be treated 
as principals under international law. Other principles allow catching into 
the net of criminal culpability individuals who might escape liability under 
traditional domestic law principles15. Canadian modes of participation in 
offences may be found to be maladapted or in need of a different interpre­
tation where applied to international crimes. The analysis of international 
jurisprudence in the interpretation of domestic principles of liability may 
therefore be of crucial importance, as was aptly confirmed by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Mugesera16. The application of international criminal 
law in Canadian administrative proceedings emanating from the immigra­
tion and refugee fields should also not be underestimated.
14. It is likely not the case for the different modes of participation in offences, which tend to 
be narrower as we shall see, but it could potentially be the case for the inchoate offences 
of conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity and war crimes or even liability as 
accessory after the fact as an autonomous offence. On universal jurisdiction, see the 
decision of the Hague District Court in Prosecutor v. Van Anraat, Case no LJN : AU8685 
(English translation at LJN : AX6406), Judgement, 23 December 2005, par. 6.3 (judge­
ment confirmed on appeal with different reasons : Case no LJN : BA4676, 9 May 2007, 
ILDC 753).
15. See e.g. Gideon Boas, James L. BiscHoFF and Natalie L. reiD, International Criminal 
Law Practitionner Library, vol. 1 “Forms of Responsibility in International Criminal 
Law”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 8­9 who highlight that the prac­
tice of the ad hoc tribunals has focused on two modes of liability specific to international 
criminal law : joint criminal enterprise and, to a lesser extent, superior responsibility.
16. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, par. 
134, 2005 SCC 40 : 
The statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR […] do not use the word “counselling”. This 
does not mean, however, that the decisions of these courts cannot be informative as 
to the requirements for counselling as a crime against humanity […] This Court found 
in Sharpe, at para. 56, that counselling refers to active inducement or encouragement 
from an objective point of view. The ICTR has found that instigation “involves 
prompting another to commit an offence” : Akayesu, Trial Chamber, at para. 482. 
The two terms are clearly related. As a result, we may look to the jurisprudence of 
the ICTY and the ICTR on instigation in determining whether counselling an offence 
that is not committed will be sufficient to satisfy the initial criminal act requirement 
for a crime against humanity under s. 7 (3.76) of the Criminal Code.
 Though the Court was concerned with whether the inchoate offence could satisfy the 
requirements of international law regarding crimes against humanity, it justified its 
reliance on international case law by the similarity in the interpretation given to the 
term “counselling” (or its equivalents) in two decisions (R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 
45 ; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case no ICTR­96­4­T, Judgement, 2 September 1998 (ICTR – 
Trial Chamber)) that were dealing at the relevant paragraphs with counselling an offence 
that is eventually committed, i.e. counselling as a mode of participation in offences.
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Considering Canada’s position on international justice issues gener­
ally, and its role in the development of international criminal law in partic­
ular, the analysis of Canada’s legislative choices provides a good case 
study of the rapidly evolving trend of prosecuting international crimes at 
the national level. This may shed light on the fundamental issues that will 
be determining factors of its success, or failure. This paper forms part of 
a broader research project on various aspects of the War Crimes Act that 
looks, for instance, into jurisdictional issues, substantive definitions of the 
core crimes and of the separate offence of superior and command liability, 
as well as available defences, justifications and excuses. The project also 
explores in a comparative light other principles of liability and inchoate 
offences not addressed herein, such as counselling, complicity after the 
fact, attempt and conspiracy. Needless to say, only the overall picture 
can represent comprehensively the promises and limits of Canadian law 
as regards participation in international crimes. This paper thus offers a 
limited review of a few modes of participation in offences applicable to 
prosecutions under the War Crimes Act. It first examines the rules regarding 
principal liability (1), before turning to the principles substantiating accom­
plice liability, namely aiding, abetting and extended liability arising out of a 
common purpose (2). It further aims at offering a preliminary assessment 
of whether such domestic legal principles are well­suited to the prosecution 
of international crimes.
1 The “Commission” of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity  
and War Crimes : Principal Liability
Article 25 (3) of the Rome Statute draws upon the experience of the 
ICTY and ICTR regarding principles of liability. The detailed provision 
on modes of participation in offences is accompanied by an obligation for 
the Prosecutor to include, in the document containing the charges against 
an accused, the legal characterisation of the facts as they accord not only 
with the substantive crimes defined at articles 6­8 of the Statute, but also 
with the precise forms of participation under articles 25 and 2817. Further­
more, once the Pre­Trial Chamber decides, in the confirmation of charges 
hearing18, that there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds 
17. Regulation 52 (c) of the international criMinal court, Regulations of the Court, 
Doc. off. ICC­BD/01­01­04/Rev.01­05. The Prosecutor can present alternative modes 
of liability. In fact, he may be required to do so if the Chamber is of the opinion that 
the evidence gives rise to such an alternative : Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Decision 
Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61 (7) (c) (ii) of the Rome Statute, 3 March 
2009, Doc. off. ICC­01/05­01/08­388 (04­03­2009, Pre­Trial Chamber III).
18. Art. 61 (7) of the Rome Statute, supra, note 2.
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to believe that an accused has committed a crime as a principal, it will 
not look into the accused’s liability according to the modes of accessory 
liability provided for at paragraphs (b) to (d) of article 25 or according to 
superior responsibility under article 2819. This approach is theoretically 
different from that of Canadian law, which imposes no obligation on the 
Prosecutor to specify whether a person is accused as a principal or as an 
accomplice20.
Article 25 (3) (a) of the Rome Statute provides the most comprehensive 
provision thus far in an international statute regarding principal liability. 
It states that
a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person :
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through 
another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible.
The Rome Statute thus criminalises individual commission but also, 
explicitly, joint commission and commission through another person, 
regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible. The first 
part of this paper compares principal liability for genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes pursuant to the War Crimes Act with equivalent 
principles under the Rome Statute or as they have been applied by the ad 
hoc tribunals.
1.1 Individual Commission
As regards individual perpetration, the applicable principles are 
relatively straightforward in both legal systems and should not raise any 
difficulties as far as their respective scopes of application are concerned. 
In the decision on the confirmation of charges of Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, the Pre­Trial Chamber described as a principal for 
“commission of the crime as an individual” he who “physically carries out 
19. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 29 January 2007, Doc. 
off. ICC­01/04/­01/06­803 (14­05­2007), par. 321 (Pre­Trial Chamber I) ; Prosecutor v. 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, supra, note 10, par. 471.
20. See e.g. R. v. Harder, [1956] S.C.R. 489 ; R. v. Thatcher, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 652, 691­694. 
However, the Prosecutor can decide to specify the nature of the participation of the 
accused in the indictment. In such a case, he or she would be limited to tendering 
evidence regarding that particular mode of participation : Gisèle côté-HarPer, Pierre 
rainville and Jean turGeon, Traité de droit pénal canadien, 4th ed., Cowansville, 
Éditions Yvon Blais, 1998, p. 736, and references cited at note 9. As we shall see, this is 
because in Canada, the principal/accomplice dichotomy carries less weight in terms of 
sentences and levels of criminal responsibility.
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all elements of the offence”21. Individual perpetration is defined similarly 
in Canadian law22. Since the Rome Statute has provided principal liability 
with a broader scope by including explicitely co­perpetration and perpetra­
tion through another person, the ICC will less likely follow the tendency of 
the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals to expand the notion of individual 
perpetration.
The ad hoc tribunals’ statutes do not provide guidance as to what 
is meant by “commission”, leaving it to the Chambers to articulate its 
proper meaning. In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber defined it as “the physical 
perpetration of a crime by the offender himself, or the culpable omission 
of an act that was mandated by a rule of criminal law23”. However, the 
notion of perpetration was extended by the ad hoc tribunals, in an effort to 
reflect properly the collective nature of international crimes. The Appeals 
Chamber in the same judgment concluded that commission was not limited 
to direct and physical perpetration, but also contemplated participation in a 
joint criminal enterprise, a doctrine which will be discussed in more detail 
below24. In the same vein, the ad hoc tribunals have also either read into 
the notion of commission the explicitly absent concept of co­perpetration25 
or given an expansive interpretation of perpetration so as to include those 
whose actions were “as much an integral part of the genocide as were the 
killings which [they] enabled26”.
Such liberal interpretations of the tribunals’ statutes illustrate the 
judges’ uneasiness with a narrow interpretation of principal liability for 
international crimes and the need to reflect adequately upon various degrees 
of direct, even if remote, participation in a crime. The ad hoc tribunals’ 
insistence that those bearing serious responsibility for international crimes 
be recognised as principals rather than as accomplices, may be explained by 
21. Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, supra, note 10, par. 488.
22. S. 21 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C­46. See G. côté-HarPer, P. rain-
ville and J. turGeon, supra, note 20, p. 720 : “[l]’auteur matériel doit avoir accompli la 
totalité des éléments constitutifs de l’infraction”.
23. Tadić Appeal, supra, note 8, par. 188. See also ICTR jurisprudence such as Prosecutor 
v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case no ICTR­95­1­A, Judgement (Reasons), 1 June 2001, 
par. 187 (ICTR – Appeals Chamber).
24. Tadić Appeal, supra, note 8, par. 191. See section 2.2.2 below.
25. Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case no IT­97­24­T, Judgement, 31 July 2003, par. 438 (ICTY – 
Trial Chamber II) [hereinafter “Stakić Trial”], later rejected by the Appeals Chamber : 
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case no IT­97­24­A, Judgement, 22 March 2006, par. 62 (ICTY – 
Appeals Chamber) [hereinafter “Stakić Appeal”].
26. Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, Case no ICTR­2001­64­A, Judgement, 7 July 2006, par. 60­61 
(ICTR – Appeals Chamber) ; Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case no ICTR­2001­66­A, Judge­
ment, 12 March 2008, par. 161 (ICTR – Appeals Chamber). See also paragraph 171.
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a general tendency to impose harsher sentences on principals27. As we shall 
see, the differentiation between principals and accomplices does not carry 
similar consequences as regards sentencing in Canadian law, at least in 
principle28. It may be that Canadian judges will feel more comfortable than 
their international counterparts in applying principles of accomplice rather 
than principal liability for masterminds and other similar “non­physical” 
participants to international crimes. Complicity will be discussed further 
below. It is fitting at this juncture to examine the notions of co­perpetration 
and perpetration through another person as they exist under the Rome 
Statute and in Canadian law.
1.2 Co-perpetration
Apart from individual commission, the Rome Statute also explicitly 
criminalises co­perpetration. A Pre­Trial Chamber of the ICC, in its deci­
sion on the confirmation of charges of Thomas Lubanga, developed rather 
complex principles in this regard29. First, the Pre­Trial Chamber elabo­
rated on the conceptual distinction between principals and accomplices. 
The Pre­Trial Chamber rejected what it termed objective and subjective 
approaches : “The objective approach […] focuses on the realisation of one 
or more of the objective elements of the crime. From this perspective, only 
those who physically carry out one or more of the objective elements of the 
offence can be considered principals to the crime30.” This is the approach 
of Canadian law. As for the subjective approach, it focuses on the state 
of mind of the accused : “only those who make their contribution with the 
shared intent to commit the offence can be considered principals to the 
crime, regardless of the level of their contribution to its commission31”. As 
the Chamber noted, this is the approach adopted by the ad hoc tribunals 
through aspects of the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise.
The Chamber elaborated on a third approach, which is not restricted to 
the physical perpetrators but also includes those who control the commis­
sion of the crime in one way or another. This approach identifies principals 
27. See Flavia Z. Giustiniani, “Stretching the Boundaries of Commission Liability. The 
ICTR Appeal Judgment in Seromba”, (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
783, 789, at footnote 30, where she refers to the views of different commentators on the 
importance that principal and secondary liability principles reflect different degrees of 
responsibility.
28. R. v. Thatcher, supra, note 20, 690. See section 2.2.1 below.
29. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra, note 19 ; the approach was largely confirmed in Pros-
ecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, supra, note 10, par. 480 ff., 519 ff.
30. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra, note 19, par. 328.
31. Id., par. 329.
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as those who control the commission of the offence and who are aware 
that they have such control because they either (1) physically perpetrated 
the objective elements of the offence (commission) ; (2) controlled the will 
of those who physically perpetrated the objective elements of the offence 
(commission through another person) ; or (3) held, with others, the control 
of the offence by reason of the essential tasks that were assigned to them 
(co­perpetration)32.
With respect to co­perpetration, the Chamber established an intricate 
test aimed at determining whether the alleged co­perpetrator had suffi­
cient control over the offence. Control was said to exist where objective 
elements were established comprising (1) the existence of a plan or agree­
ment between two or more persons and (2) an essential contribution by 
each co­perpetrator to the realisation of the offence. Subjective elements 
also needed to be established requiring (1) that the suspect have the neces­
sary mens rea regarding the crime at issue ; (2) that the suspect and other 
co­perpetrators share in the knowledge that the realisation of the objective 
elements of the crime might result from the implementation of their plan ; 
and (3) that the suspect know of the factual circumstances allowing him to 
exercise joint control over the commission of the crime33.
It remains to be seen whether this approach will become solid ICC 
jurisprudence. The current principles reveal a limited similarity with Cana­
dian law on the issue. Section 21 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code, despite its use 
of the singular, certainly does not exclude a plurality of perpetrators34. The 
distinction between a co­perpetrator and an accomplice turns on the issue 
whether the parties acted “in concert, pursuant to a common motive35”. 
There must be “[a]n intention to act in concert with another [which] is 
[…] an integral part of the doctrine that, where one person commits one 
element of the offence and another person commits another element of 
the offence, both are co­perpetrators of the offence36”. The analogy with 
the Rome Statute ends here. In Canadian law, it is also essential that the 
accused must have actually committed one of the essential elements of the 
actus reus : “il ne suffit pas de contribuer à la perpétration de l’infraction 
mais bien d’en réaliser au moins un élément essentiel (sans quoi plus rien 
ne départage les alinéas a) et b) de l’article 21 (1)37”. It is not the importance 
32. Id., par. 332.
33. Id., par. 342­367.
34. See s. 33 (2) of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I­21.
35. R. v. Wood (1989), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 201, 220 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal dismissed, S.C.C., 
28­06­1990, 21829).
36. R. v. Mena (1987), 34 C.C.C. (3d) 304, 316 (Ont. C.A.).
37. G. côté-HarPer, P. rainville and J. turGeon, supra, note 20, p. 731.
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of the contribution of a person in the commission of an offence that will 
determine whether he or she is a co­perpetrator or an accomplice, but 
whether he or she has accomplished a part of the actus reus38. There lies 
the most fundamental difference between the current interpretation of 
the Rome Statute and Canadian law. In Lubanga, the Pre­Trial Chamber 
clearly stated that the contribution needed not be linked to the actus reus 
at the execution stage and thus rejected the view that only those who physi­
cally commit an aspect of the actus reus can be considered principals to 
the crime39.
Co­perpetratorship in Canadian law is thus much more limited in scope 
than under the Rome Statute, which was strongly influenced by continental 
European legal models. It excludes individuals who have not physically 
committed an element of the actus reus of an offence that was materially 
perpetrated by others, but to which they have nonetheless contributed in 
an essential manner and according to a common concerted plan.
1.3 Perpetration Through Another Person
Article 25 (3) (a) of the Rome Statute also criminalises commission 
“through another person40”. The concept of innocent agency is known to 
Canadian law. In such instances, a person who has not personally committed 
any material element of the offence may nevertheless be considered a prin­
cipal to it41. The innocent agent is used by the perpetrator to commit an 
unlawful act. He or she is either unaware that the act is unlawful, or cannot 
be held responsible because of mental illness or minority, for instance, or 
because he or she was acting under duress.
However, article 25 (3) (a) of the Rome Statute does not limit itself 
to perpetration through an innocent agent. It specifies that commission 
through another person occurs “regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible”. It thus recognises the possibility of perpetration 
through a guilty agent, a concept which it distinguishes from co­perpe­
tration. This concept is foreign to Canadian law and may originate from 
38. Id., p. 729.
39. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra, note 19, par. 348 (also par. 328). See also Prosecutor v. 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, supra, note 10, par. 526.
40. Note that the ICC Pre­Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, 
supra, note 10, par. 491, further confirmed that co-perpetratorship through a guilty or 
innocent agent is contemplated by the Statute : “basing a person’s criminal responsibility 
upon the joint commission of a crime through one or more persons is therefore a mode 
of liability ‘in accordance with the Statute’” [emphasis added]. This amounts to the 
creation of a fourth mode of principal liability under art. 25 (3) (a) of the Rome Statute.
41. See e.g. R. v. Berryman (1990), 78 C.R. (3d) 376, 381­387 (B.C.C.A.).
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similar doctrines found in States within the continental European legal 
tradition42. In Katanga and Chui, the ICC Pre­Trial Chamber I elaborated 
on this doctrine, which it also identified by the terms : “perpetrator behind 
the perpetrator (Täter hinter dem Täter)43”. It explained :
The underlying rationale of this model of criminal responsibility is that the perpe­
trator behind the perpetrator is responsible because he controls the will of the 
direct perpetrator. As such, in some scenarios it is possible for both perpetrators 
to be criminally liable as principals : the direct perpetrator for his fulfilment of 
the subjective and objective elements of the crime, and the perpetrator behind 
the perpetrator for his control over the crime via his control over the will of the 
direct perpetrator44.
As to the applicability of the doctrine to cases most relevant to inter­
national criminal law, the Chamber noted that they “are those in which 
the perpetrator behind the perpetrator commits the crime through another 
by means of ‘control over an organisation’ (Organisationsherrschaft)45”. 
It stated :
The leader must use his control over the apparatus to execute crimes, which means 
that the leader, as the perpetrator behind the perpetrator, mobilises his authority 
and power within the organisation to secure compliance with his orders. Compli­
ance must include the commission of any of the crimes under the jurisdiction of 
this Court46.
The somewhat controversial47 notion of perpetration through a guilty 
agent seems destined to a great future. On 4 March 2009, an ICC Pre­Trial 
Chamber issued an arrest warrant against the President of Sudan, Omar 
42. See examples provided by Robert cryer and others, An Introduction to International 
Criminal Law and Procedure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 303 ; 
see also Florian JessBerGer and Julia Geneuss, “On the Application of a Theory of 
Indirect Perpetration in Al Bashir. German Doctrine at The Hague ?”, (2008) 6 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 853.
43. Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, supra, note 10, par. 496.
44. Id., par. 497.
45. Id., par. 498, and on the doctrine generally, see par. 495­518. See also Prosecutor v. 
Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
Jean­Pierre Bemba Gombo, 10 June 2008, Doc. off. ICC­01/05­01/08­14­t (17­07­2008), 
par. 69­84 (Pre­Trial Chamber III). For a more extensive description of the doctrine, see 
e.g. F. JessBerGer and J. Geneuss, supra, note 42, 863, at footnote 48.
46. Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, supra, note 10, par. 514.
47. R. cryer and others, supra, note 42, p. 303. Also, despite its inclusion in the Rome 
Statute, it is unsettled whether this doctrine forms part of customary international law : 
Stakić Appeal, supra, note 25, par. 62 ; contra : Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, supra, note 26, 
par. 21 (Schomburg J., in dissent). See also Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, 
supra, note 10, par. 508, where the Pre­Trial Chamber said it needed not decide the issue 
since the Rome Statute was decisive.
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Al Bashir, for crimes committed in Darfur, based on this concept48. The 
majority of the Chamber found that there were reasonable grounds to 
believe that Omar Al Bashir and other high­ranking Sudanese political and 
military leaders directed the branches of the State apparatus and led them, 
in a coordinated manner, to implement jointly a common plan consisting of 
a counter­insurgency campaign against rebel groups, as well as an unlawful 
attack on a part of the civilian population of Darfur perceived as being 
close to the rebels. The targeted tribes were to be subjected to forcible 
transfers and acts of murder, extermination, rape, torture, and pillage49. 
The Chamber also found that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
Omar Al Bashir, as de jure and de facto President of the State of Sudan and 
Commander­in­Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces at all times relevant 
to the Prosecution Application, played an essential role in coordinating the 
design and implementation of the common plan50”. He stands accused of 
numerous charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Perpetration through a guilty agent and co­perpetration will likely 
play an essential role at the ICC in securing accountability of masterminds 
and the likes who control the commission of core crimes without them­
selves executing an aspect of the actus reus of such crimes. Considering 
the absence, or limited scope, of these modes of liability under Canadian 
law, principal liability will be inapplicable for a wide range of persons 
responsible for the “most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole51”. It may, or it may not, be a consequential limita­
tion of Canadian law. It will in fact be problematic only if participants to 
48. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir (“Omar Al Bashir”), Decision on the Prosecution’s Applica­
tion for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, 
Doc. off. ICC­02/05­01/09­3 (04­03­2009, Pre­Trial Chamber I). See also international 
criMinal court, Situation in Darfur, The Sudan, “Public Redacted Version of Pros­
ecutor’s Application under Article 58”, Public Document, 14 July 2008, Doc. off. ICC­
02/05­157­AnxA (12­09­2008, Pre­Trial Chamber I), [Online], [www.icc­cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc559999.pdf] (26 October 2009) ; international criMinal court, oFFice oF 
tHe Prosecutor, Situation in Darfur, The Sudan, “Summary of the Case. Prosecutor’s 
Application for Warrant of Arrest under 58 Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, 
The Hague, 14 July 2008, [Online], [www.icc­cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/64FA6B33­05C3­
4E9C­A672­3FA2B58CB2C9/277758/ICCOTPSummary20081704ENG.pdf] (26 October 
2009). The summons to appear issued against a rebel commander is also based on this 
concept (as well as co­perpetratorship) : The Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, 7 May 2009, Doc. off. ICC­02/05­02/09­15­
AnxA (29­07­2009, Pre­Trial Chamber I).
49. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, supra, note 48, par. 214­220.
50. Id., par. 221.
51. Rome Statute, supra, note 2, preambular par. 4.
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international offences escape justice because their contribution cannot be 
encompassed adequately by other applicable principles. 
This leads us to a comparative analysis of accomplice liability and 
the manner in which it may apply to international crimes in Canada. This 
enquiry may shed light on the intricate question of whether the War Crimes 
Act, by referring exclusively to principles of liability available in Canadian 
law, has equipped Canadian courts well enough to embark, as they must, 
on the difficult journey of war crimes prosecution.
2 Complicity : Aiding, Abetting and Common Purpose
Accomplice liability is called to play an essential role in the endeavour 
of imputing liability to the numerous individuals who may have contributed 
to the commission of international crimes. This is particularly so in situa­
tions where a restrictive view of principal liability is adopted, as we have 
seen is the case in Canadian law. The aim of this second Part is to assess, in 
light of the international principles, whether and how Canadian principles 
of accomplice liability can reflect the reality of international crimes, in 
full respect of the principle of complementarity, while staying true to the 
canons of domestic criminal law. 
2.1 Modes of Participation Included in the Crimes against Humanity 
and War Crimes Act
Sections 4 (1) and 6 (1) of the War Crimes Act state that “[e]very 
person is guilty of an indictable offence who commits” [emphasis added] 
one of the core crimes. It specifically adds, at paragraph (1.1), that “[e]very 
person who conspires or attempts to commit, is an accessory after the fact 
in relation to, or counsels in relation to, an offence referred to in subsection 
(1) is guilty of an indictable offence.”
The Act does not explicitly include important forms of participation 
in a crime provided for at section 21 of the Criminal Code, namely aiding, 
abetting and extended liability arising out of a common purpose52. This has 
52. This is in stark contrast with the repealed s. 7 (3.77) of the Criminal Code, which was much 
more explicit : “In the definitions ‘crime against humanity’ and ‘war crime’ in subsec­
tion (3.76), ‘act or omission’ includes, for greater certainty, attempting or conspiring to 
commit, counselling any person to commit, aiding or abetting any person in the commis­
sion of, or being an accessory after the fact in relation to, an act or omission.” Interest­
ingly, and though it has no interpretative value, the marginal note at ss. 4 (1.1) and 6 (1.1) 
of the War Crimes Act reads differently in English than in French. In English, it reads 
“[c]onspiracy, attempt, etc.” while in French it reads : “[p]unition de la tentative, de la 
complicité, etc.” [emphasis added]. It is puzzling that “conspiracy” has been rendered 
3097 vol_50#3-4_sept-dec09.indd   981 10-02-19   12:36
982 Les Cahiers de Droit (2009) 50 C. de D. 967
led to debates and arguments as to whether complicity (before the fact) 
can form a basis for prosecution of a core international crime in Canada53. 
Fortunately, the negative view does not withstand scrutiny. Indeed, there 
is no doubt that section 34 (2) of the Interpretation Act54 allows the provi­
sions of the Criminal Code on modes of participation to apply to offences 
prosecuted under the War Crimes Act55.
Any other interpretation would be both unjustifiable and unduly 
restrictive and would run contrary to the principle of complementarity, 
which requires that national prosecutions be able to be conducted for the 
whole range of crimes and perpetrators within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
in French as “complicité”, despite the fact that the Criminal Code generally uses the 
term “complot”. Discussions were held on this marginal note in the debates before 
the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, without however 
taking issue on this matter. See : canaDa, House oF coMMons, stanDinG coMMittee 
on ForeiGn aFFairs anD international traDe, Crimes Against Humanity, Meeting 
52 – Evidence, 1 June 2000, [Online], [www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.
aspx ?DocId=1040378&Mode=1&Parl=36&Ses=2&Language=E] (15 December 2009).
53. This argument was, unsurprisingly, attempted by Désiré Munyaneza in his final legal 
arguments. The judgment of Denis J. in R. c. Munyaneza, 2009 QCCS 2201, did not 
address the issue, most probably since he concluded that the accused directly committed 
the crimes. Discussions on this issue were also held before the Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, where some interveners suggested that it be 
explicitly included : See, for instance, the remarks by Warren Allmand, President, Rights 
and Democracy : canaDa, House oF coMMons, stanDinG coMMittee on ForeiGn 
aFFairs anD international traDe, Crimes Against Humanity, Meeting 46 – Evidence, 
16 May 2000, [Online], [www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx ?DocId=10
40319&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=36&Ses=2] (15 December 2009) ; see also exchange 
between Bruce Broomhall, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and Irwin Cotler, MP 
for Mount­Royal : canaDa, House oF coMMons, stanDinG coMMittee on ForeiGn 
aFFairs anD international traDe, Crimes Against Humanity, Meeting 49 – Evidence, 
30 May 2000, [Online], [www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx ?DocId=1
040375&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=36&Ses=2] (15 December 2009).
54. Interpretation Act, supra, note 34. 
55. On the applicability of s. 21 of the Criminal Code to Federal Statutes, see e.g. Nagal-
ingam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2009] 2 F.C.R. 52, par. 67, 
2008 FCA 153, 292 D.L.R. (4th) 463 ; implicitly in R. v. Greenough, [2006] N.B.J. no 409, 
par. 27­30, 71 W.C.B. (2d) 492. With respect to the War Crimes Act, the Federal Court 
of Appeal was unambiguous in its conclusion that complicity was contemplated by the 
Act in the case of Zazai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 
303, though the conclusion was not based on the applicability of the Interpretation Act. 
See generally : G. côté-HarPer, P. rainville and J. turGeon, supra, note 20, p. 74 
and references cited therein ; specifically with respect to the War Crimes Act : Rachel 
GronDin, “La responsabilité pénale du chef militaire : un défaut d’agir mais pas un défaut 
d’état d’esprit”, (2004) 34 R.G.D. 309, 313 ; W. Cory Wanless, “Corporate Liability for 
International Crimes under Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act”, 
(2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 201, 207.
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The inclusion of paragraph (1.1) was probably deemed necessary because 
the offences designated therein are autonomous offences in the Criminal 
Code and not modes of participation in crimes. Interestingly, as we shall 
see, some of these offences are not criminalised as such in international 
criminal law.
2.2 Aiding and Abetting 
In Canadian law as well as in international criminal law, aiding and 
abetting are separate forms of secondary liability, but they are typically 
used and referred to together56. They will be treated in a similar fashion 
here except where distinctions are warranted. 
Paragraphs 21 (1) (b) and (c) of the Criminal Code provide :
(1) Every one is a party to an offence who […]
(b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit 
it ; or
(c) abets any person in committing it.
Article 25 (3) (c) of the Rome Statute provides that
a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person : […]
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets 
or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including 
providing the means for its commission.
Aiding and abetting is likely to play a less important role before the 
ICC than before Canadian courts, because of the wide scope given to 
principal liability in the Rome Statute. Similarly, aiding and abetting has 
had a limited significance before the ad hoc tribunals, which relied exten­
sively on joint criminal enterprise as a mode of principal liability57. For 
this reason, Canadian judges, when applying the notion of aiding and abet­
ting to international crimes, should not only be guided by the principles 
56. On their separate meaning, see in Canadian law R. v. Greyeyes, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 825, par. 
26 (Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ. : minority concurring opinion ; point not discussed by 
the majority). In international law, see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra, note 16, par. 484.
57. Clearly, international tribunals also often focus on those bearing the greatest respon­
sibility for international crimes – leaders, masterminds, and high or mid­range perpetra­
tors. Though Canadian courts may end up having before them low­level perpetrators 
for the most part, the law must be able to address all levels of contributions to the core 
crimes. Furthermore, “ordering”, “soliciting” and “inducing” the commission of crimes 
which are eventually committed or attempted, as per art. 25 (3) (b) of the Rome Statute 
or 7 (1) and 6 (1) of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes respectively, are important forms of 
secondary liability. While “ordering” is absent in Canadian law, “counselling” as a mode 
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developed by the international tribunals as regards aiding and abetting. 
Canadian jurisprudence should also consider as informative the ICC juris­
prudence on principal liability, notably co­perpetration and commission 
through another person, as well as the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence on 
the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise. This will be particularly important 
where the accused is a leader, a mastermind of crimes or a mid­level partici­
pant whose contribution to the actual crime(s), and links to the physical 
perpetrators, are more remote than is often the case with the accomplice 
under traditional common law.
2.2.1 Comparative Analysis
Before turning to differences, it may be useful to note at the outset 
that Canadian law and international criminal law (as interpreted by the ad 
hoc tribunals) coincide in various respects regarding aiding and abetting. 
For instance, both legal systems are in broad agreement concerning the 
consequences of mere presence and omissions. Though there are nuances, 
it will not be necessary to delve into this issue here58. Furthermore, in both 
systems, the guilt of the aider or abettor does not depend upon the principal 
being prosecuted or even identified59. Moreover, it is entirely possible that 
the principal may not even be aware of the accused’s contribution60. Both 
legal systems also criminalise complicity of an attempted offence, though 
the consequences of such conduct may end up being quite different. Indeed, 
article 25 (3) (f) of the Rome Statute criminalises attempt, but the language 
used seems to indicate that liability will be incurred for the main crime that 
was attempted rather than for a self­standing inchoate crime of attempt61. 
of participation in offences is equivalent to “soliciting” and “inducing” and will also 
be called to play a crucial role in domestic prosecutions for international crimes. As 
mentioned above, the analysis of counselling is not addressed in this paper.
58. In international criminal law, see e.g. Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case no IT­95­17/1­T, 
Judgement, 10 December 1998, par. 203, 232 (ICTY – Trial Chamber) ; Prosecutor v. 
Brđanin, Case no IT­99­36­A, Judgement, 3 April 2007, par. 273 (ICTY – Appeals 
Chamber) ; Prosecutor v. Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, Case no IT­95­13/1­A, Judgement, 
5 May 2009, par. 51 ff. (ICTY – Appeals Chamber) ; in Canadian law, see e.g. R. v. 
Dunlop, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 881.
59. In Canadian law, see e.g. s. 23.1 of the Criminal Code ; in international criminal law, see 
e.g. Stakić Trial, supra, note 25, par. 554 ; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra, note 16, par. 
530.
60. In Canadian law, see G. côté-HarPer, P. rainville and J. turGeon, supra, note 20, 
p. 768 and authorities cited therein ; in international criminal law, see e.g. Tadić Appeal, 
supra, note 8, par. 229.
61. S. 25 (3) (f) of the Rome Statute, supra, note 2, reads : “In accordance with this Statute, 
a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court if that person […] (f) Attempts to commit such a crime” 
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This distinction has an impact, among other things, on aiders and abettors 
of an uncompleted offence. Indeed, under the Rome Statute, an accom­
plice to an offence that was only attempted will be prosecuted for that 
offence, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes62. In 
Canada, the same person would be prosecuted for the self­standing offence 
of attempt63. Normally, under Canadian law the sentence is much more 
lenient for attempt than for the actual crime64. However, exceptionally, 
the War Crimes Act applies the same sentence for the committed crime as 
for the inchoate offences contemplated therein, including attempt, thereby 
ensuring greater consistency with the Rome Statute65. There have been no 
convictions for attempt under international criminal law, so it is difficult to 
anticipate how its gravity will be assessed for the purposes of sentencing. 
The Court would no doubt refer to general principles, in accordance with 
article 21 (2) of the Statute, and probably find that virtually all legal systems 
punish attempts less severely than crimes that actually take place.
A first major difference between international criminal law and Cana­
dian law has already been identified but should be highlighted in more detail 
here. There has been a tendency in international criminal law to consider 
aiders and abettors as having a lower degree of criminal responsibility 
than principals. Consequently, it was held that “aiding and abetting is a 
form of responsibility which generally warrants a lower sentence than […] 
responsibility as a co­perpetrator”66. In Canada, as in English common law, 
[emphasis added]. It therefore seems that attempt to commit a crime within the jurisdic­
tion of the ICC, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, will attract 
liability for that crime. This is consonant with art. 5 (1), which lists exhaustively the 
crimes for which the Court has jurisdiction. Contra : see G. Boas, J.L. BiscHoFF and 
N.L. reiD, supra, note 15, p. 333.
62. Art. 25 (3) (c) of the Rome Statute, reproduced above.
63. In Canadian law, since attempt is an autonomous offence, there can be secondary liability 
through the combined effect of ss. 21, 24 and 463 of the Criminal Code. Ss. 4 (1.1) and 6 
(1.1) of the War Crimes Act criminalise attempt as an inchoate offence : “Every person 
who […] attempts to commit […] an offence referred to in subsection (1) is guilty of an 
indictable offence.” The inchoate nature is confirmed at subsection (2) which provides 
for sentences : “Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) or (1.1)” 
[emphasis added].
64. S. 463 (a) of the Criminal Code (imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years).
65. Ss. 4 (2) (b) and 6 (2) (b) of the War Crimes Act provide for a possibility of imprison­
ment for life compared to a possibility of a term of a maximum of thirty years under the 
Rome Statute or, perhaps less likely considering the inchoate nature of attempt, of a life 
sentence (art. 77 (1) (b) of the Rome Statute justifies life imprisonment by the extreme 
gravity of the crime).
66. Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case no IT­98­32­A, Judgement, 25 February 2004, par. 182 
(ICTY – Appeals Chamber) ; see e.g. Prosecutor v. Milutinović and others, Case no IT­05­
87­T, Judgement, 26 February 2009, par. 90 (ICTY – Trial Chamber) ; Prosecutor v. Orić, 
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principal and secondary parties are charged with the same offence and 
are subject in principle to the same sentence67. The trial judge, however, 
retains full discretion to impose a sentence that is in accordance with the 
degree of culpability of each participant68. The practical impact of the 
principal/secondary dichotomy is therefore much less significant in Canada. 
However, the distinction between principals and accomplices remains rele­
vant because, among other things, the requirements are different regarding 
the material and mental elements, causality and defences. Considering the 
narrow scope of principal liability, the limits of the law on secondary partic­
ipation will in many cases represent the limits of Canadian law regarding 
liability for international crimes.
Regarding the actus reus of aiding and abetting, it may be noted that 
international criminal law requires that the assistance have an effect, usually 
described as substantial, upon the perpetration of the crime. The classic 
formulation of this principle emanates from the Tadić appeal : “The aider 
and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend 
moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, exter­
mination, rape, torture, wanton destruction of civilian property, etc.), and 
this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime69.” 
Though the act or omission must have a substantial effect, there is no 
requirement of a causal connection70.
In Canadian law, the effect of the assistance or encouragement on the 
commission of the crime is probably irrelevant, and is, in any case, certainly 
insufficient. As Côté­Harper, Rainville and Turgeon have explained, “[l]a 
culpabilité du complice n’est […] en rien tributaire de l’efficacité de son 
aide […] Le droit permet en définitive la condamnation du complice en 
Case no IT­03­68­T, Judgement, 30 June 2006, par. 281 (ICTY – Trial Chamber II).
67. R. v. Thatcher, supra, note 20, 690.
68. See discussion in G. côté-HarPer, P. rainville and J. turGeon, supra, note 20, p. 742.
69. Tadić Appeal, supra, note 8, par. 229 (iii) [emphasis added], referring inter alia to art. 
2 (3) (d) of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 51 
UN GAOR Supp. (no 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996), which 
requires that the aiding and abetting be “direc[t] and substantia[l]” ; see also Prosecutor 
v. Vasiljević, supra, note 66, par. 102 ; Prosecutor v. Milutinović and others, supra, note 
66, par. 89 ; Prosecutor v. Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, supra, note 58, par. 81. Commenta­
tors have observed that the tribunals have interpreted this as meaning an effect that is 
more than de minimis : Kai aMBos, “Article 25 : Individual Criminal Responsibility”, in 
Otto triFFterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court : Observer’s Notes, Article by Article, Baden­Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1999, p. 475, at page 481.
70. Prosecutor v. Kvočka and others, Case no IT­98­30/1­A, Judgement, 28 February 2005, 
par. 98 (ICTY – Appeals Chamber).
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l’absence de preuve de l’utilité de son rôle dans la perpétration du crime71”. 
This is mainly because aiding (and abetting) requires further proof of the 
specific intent to assist in the commission of the crime72. Therefore, one can 
safely advance that the ad hoc tribunals’ requirement that the aiding and 
abetting have a substantial effect upon the committed or attempted crime 
is a notable difference with Canadian law (where, however, the conduct of 
an “accomplice” that is in and of itself a “significant contributing cause” of 
a prohibited result would qualify for principal liability)73. The effect of the 
aiding or abetting on the perpetration of the crime is thus not a decisive 
issue in Canadian law, if at all it is an issue. Notably, the Rome Statute 
71. G. côté-HarPer, P. rainville and J. turGeon, supra, note 20, p. 747­748, see also 760, 
761­764. See also Eric colvin and Sanjeev ananD, Principles of Criminal Law, 3d ed., 
Toronto, Thomson/Carswell, 2007, p. 563, but also at 564 where the authors argue that 
abetting, which is not explicitly expressed with “an ulterior mens rea”, would require 
that there be encouragement in fact. See also the opinion of Cory J. in R. v. Greyeyes, 
supra, note 56, par. 38, which could be interpreted as requiring both encouragement in 
fact and specific intent to encourage the commission of the crime. This has been convinc­
ingly criticised : see e.g. G. côté-HarPer, P. rainville and J. turGeon, supra, note 20, 
p. 762­763.
72. While this is clear for “aiding” (R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973, par. 31), the Supreme 
Court of Canada opened the door to ambiguity in R. v. Hamilton, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 432, 
2005 SCC 47, by deciding that recklessness would suffice for counselling, which is 
somewhat similar to abetting. S. 21 (1) (c) of the Criminal Code, like s. 22, being silent 
on the required mens rea for abetting, the question arguably remains open. However, it 
has generally been accepted in Canadian law that specific intention is required for abet­
ting under s. 21 (1) (c) : see e.g. R. v. Helsdon, 2007 ONCA 54, par. 43, 216 C.C.C. (3d) 
1 ; R. v. Almarales, 2008 ONCA 692, par. 67, [2008] O.J. no 3937 (ln/ql) (the latter both 
delivered post­Hamilton) ; R. v. Feddema, 2005 ABCA 236, par. 62, [2005] A.J. no 789 
(ln/ql) ; R. v. Greyeyes, supra, note 56, par. 38 (Cory J.) ; R. v. Curran (1977), 1 W.W.R. 
255 (Alta. S.C. (A.D.)), [1977] A.J. no 770 (ln/ql) (leave to appel to SCC refused) ; see 
also Pierre rainville, “Le verbe fait crime : la répression de l’instigation et les avatars 
de l’arrêt Hamilton”, (2007) 11 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 177, 198­199, who argues convinc­
ingly that Hamilton cannot be interpreted so as to require a lesser degree of mens rea 
of the abettor than of the aider, s. 21 (1) (b) and (c) being complementary ; see also his 
useful discussion of the distinction between counselling and abetting (201). To the same 
effect, Don stuart, Canadian Criminal Law. A Treatise, 5th ed., Scarborough, Thomson 
Carswell, 2007, p. 636 and references cited therein ; G. côté-HarPer, P. rainville and 
J. turGeon, supra, note 20, p. 790 and references cited therein.
73. The discussion here does not include the causation requirements for accomplices in 
prosecutions under s. 231 (5) or (6) of the Criminal Code, where only an “immediate, 
direct and substantial” participation will warrant a first degree murder conviction (R. v. 
Harbottle, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 306 ; R. v. Nette, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 488, at 522).
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does not — at least expressly — require that the aiding or abetting make a 
substantial contribution to the crime74.
As regards the mens rea of aiding and abetting, there is a noteworthy 
difference between Canadian law and international criminal law : Cana­
dian law requires a specific intention to assist, whereas the ad hoc tribu­
nals’ jurisprudence requires the accused to have knowledge that his or her 
conduct will assist a specific crime. In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber makes 
this clear : “In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element 
is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the 
commission of a specific crime by the principal75.” Whether and to what 
extent there exists a significant difference between intent, on the one hand, 
and knowledge, on the other hand, is unclear. In Canada, the intention to 
assist has sometimes been described in terms of knowledge. In Hibbert, in 
an attempt to define the meaning of “purpose” in the context of section 21 
(1) (b) of the Criminal Code, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with 
commentators “that a person who consciously performs an act knowing 
the consequences that will (with some degree of certainty) flow from it 
‘intends’ these consequences or causes them ‘on purpose’, regardless of 
whether he or she desired them76”. Don Stuart adds : “Subjective mens rea 
is a concept of cognitive awareness and no more77”. Noting that purpose 
had been equated with intention, Eric Colvin and Sanjeev Anand write that 
“[i]t is therefore possible for someone to aid an offence in the sense that it is 
known that aid will result78”. Kent Roach, on the other hand, declares that 
“[k]nowledge is a slightly lower form of subjective mens rea than intent or 
purpose79”. It may be that the only true distinction would be if intent was 
74. Gerhard Werle argues that it should however be interpreted in this way : G. Werle, 
supra, note 9, 969. This reflects his view of the hierarchy in the degrees of participation 
in crimes inherent in the structure of art. 25 (3) of the Rome Statute. Joint commission 
requires a higher level of contribution involving control over the commission of the 
crime, aiding and abetting a lower, though substantial, level of contribution, whereas 
paragraph (d) covers “any contribution” to a group crime and would yield “the weakest 
form of liability” (at 969­971). Contra : see William A. scHaBas, “Enforcing International 
Humanitarian Law : Catching the Accomplices”, International Review of the Red Cross, 
vol. 83, no 842, 2001, p. 439­459, at page 448 (with respect to the level of contribution 
required of the aider and abettor under the Rome Statute).
75. Tadić Appeal, supra, note 8, par. 229 (iv) ; see also Prosecutor v. Furundžija, supra, note 
58, par. 190­249.
76. R. v. Hibbert, supra, note 72, par. 29 [emphasis added], referring to Alan W. MeWett and 
Morris ManninG, Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 1985, p. 113.
77. D. stuart, supra, note 72, p. 224.
78. E. colvin and S. ananD, supra, note 71, p. 568.
79. Kent roacH, Criminal Law, 4th ed., Toronto, Irwin Law, 2009, p. 171.
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interpreted as importing “the idea of ‘desire’ into the definition”80. This 
approach was rejected by the Supreme Court in Hibbert81.
The distinction may also be dependant upon the degree of likelihood of 
the consequence. In Chartrand, the expression “with intent to” at section 
281 of the Criminal Code was interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada 
as requiring proof that the accused either had a conscious purpose to cause 
the event or that the consequence was “foreseen by the accused as a certain 
or substantially certain result82”. According to this view, which also finds 
support in English common law83, the degree of likelihood of the consequence 
serves to distinguish between intent and recklessness. With respect to the 
former, the result must be certain or substantially certain whereas the latter 
will be satisfied with the accused’s subjective awareness of the possibility 
or probability of the result occurring. Therefore, both intention and reckless­
ness can be expressed in terms of subjective “knowledge”. The distinction 
will depend on the knowledge of the degree of likelihood of the occurrence 
of the prohibited result84. The Rome Statute provides further support for this 
interpretation. Article 30 (2) states :
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where :
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct ;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence 
or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events [emphasis added].
80. R. v. Hibbert, supra, note 72, par. 27.
81. Id., par. 29.
82. R. v. Chartrand, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 864, 894, par. 61 ; R. v. Buzzanga (1979), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 
369 (Ont. C.A.). See also E. colvin and S. ananD, supra, note 71, p. 181 and 193.
83. See e.g. R. v. Moloney, [1985] 2 W.L.R. 648, [1985] 1 All E.R. 1025 (H.L. (Eng.)) ; John 
C. sMitH and Brian HoGan, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, 11th ed. by David C. 
orMeroD, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 94.
84. Note that the majority in R. v. Hamilton, supra, note 72, par. 33, refused to definitely 
set out the degree of risk for recklessess. Note also the particular mens rea for murder 
under s. 229 (a) (ii) of the Criminal Code. This provision has an element of recklessness 
as to whether death is “likely” to result. The required mens rea is : (a) subjective intent 
to cause bodily harm ; (b) subjective knowledge that the bodily harm is of such a nature 
that it is likely to result in death. The Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Cooper, [1993] 
1 S.C.R. 146, par. 22 and 30, has however said that it was only a “slight relaxation” from 
“intention to kill”. The Court saw the distinction thus (id., 154­155, par. 19) : “The aspect 
of recklessness can be considered an afterthought since to secure a conviction under 
this section it must be established that the accused had the intent to cause such grievous 
bodily harm that he knew it was likely to cause death. One who causes bodily harm that 
he knows is likely to cause death must, in those circumstances, have a deliberate disregard 
for the fatal consequences which are known to be likely to occur. That is to say he must, 
of necessity, be reckless whether death ensues or not.”
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The latter provision thus allows intent to be established either in the 
presence of a conscious purpose (the accused means to cause the conse­
quence) or if there exists subjective foresight that the result is certain or 
substantially certain to occur (will occur in the ordinary course of events). 
It may be added that paragraph 3 under article 30 defines “knowledge” 
exactly like “intent” as regards consequences : “‘knowledge’ means aware­
ness that […] a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events”. 
Accordingly, article 30 likely excludes recklessness as a basis for liability. 
The ICC Pre­Trial Chamber in Lubanga confirmed that recklessness is not 
included under article 30, but then adopted a very expansive interpretation 
of intention and knowledge, equating them with what Canadian law would 
consider to be recklessness. Indeed, the Pre­Trial Chamber accepted that 
the volitional element included not only conscious purpose and foresight 
of the necessary (certain) outcome of the conduct, but also awareness of 
a risk, that could be substantial or even low85. However, another Pre­Trial 
Chamber, in a posterior and well­reasoned decision, was unequivocal that 
article 30 is limited to “actual intent or will to bring about the material 
elements of the crime” and awareness “that those elements will be the 
almost inevitable outcome of his acts or omissions”. It clearly rejected any 
lower standard86.
The ad hoc tribunals have not made clear whether the accused must 
know that his assistance “will” or “may” or “will probably” assist in the 
commission of the crime. Some commentators have rejected that “knowl­
edge” in this case includes recklessness87. This view is supported by the 
first element (strangely) included in the actus reus of aiding and abetting by 
85. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra, note 19, par. 352­355. For a cogent critique, see Thomas 
WeiGenD, “Intent, Mistake of Law, and Co­perpetration in the Lubanga Decision 
on Confirmation of Charges”, (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 471, 
480­484, who argues that art. 30 (2) (b) “precludes any extension of intent liability 
beyond consciously taking a ‘substantial risk’”. Interestingly, a draft provision refer­
ring to recklessness was deleted during the negotiations in Rome : see Draft Statute for 
the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (14 April 1998), art. 
29 (4), [Online], [www.un.org/law/n9810105.pdf] (26 October 2009). See also Kai aMBos, 
“General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute”, (1999) 10 Crim. L.F. 1, 21.
86. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Decision pursuant to art. 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute on the charges of the Prosecutor against Jean­Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 
2009, Doc. off. ICC­01/05­01/08­424 (15­06­2009), par. 357­369 (Pre­Trial Chamber II).
87. Ilias BanteKas and Susan nasH, International Criminal Law, 3d ed., London, Rout­
ledge­Cavendish, 2007, p. 22. Interestingly, in Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case no IT­95­14­A, 
Judgement, 29 July 2004, par. 38 (ICTY – Appeals Chamber), the Appeals Chamber, while 
attempting to circumscribe the mental element of “ordering”, interpreted the common law 
notion of recklessness as limited to the awareness that the consequence will probably, 
not merely possibly, occur.
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the ad hoc tribunals, namely that “it must be proven that the alleged aider 
and abettor committed acts specifically aimed at assisting, encouraging, or 
lending moral support for the perpetration of a specific crime88”.
Assuming intent/purpose is a stricter requirement than knowledge, it 
is important to note that the Rome Statute seems in any case to impose a 
higher degree of mens rea for aiding and abetting than the ad hoc tribunals’ 
jurisprudence. Article 25 (3) (c) reads : “For the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commis­
sion or its attempted commission89”. This wording is reminiscent of section 
21 (1) (b) of the Criminal Code. It will be recalled that the Supreme Court of 
Canada interpreted “purpose” in that provision as “being essentially synon­
ymous with ‘intention’”90. It remains to be seen how the ICC will interpret 
the purpose requirement, and speculations in this regard have been many91. 
However, at least until such time as the ICC decides conclusively on the 
matter, the similarity in language as between the Criminal Code and the 
Rome Statute favours an interpretation of Canadian law regarding mens rea 
in harmony with the Rome Statute, if not with international customary law 
as it has been interpreted by the ad hoc tribunals. Complicity by reckless­
ness is therefore excluded both in Canadian law and under the Rome Statute, 
and specific intent to assist is required92.
As a further mens rea requirement of aiding and abetting, interna­
tional criminal law and Canadian law require that the accused be aware, 
at a minimum, of the essential elements of the substantive crime for which 
88. Prosecutor v. Seromba, supra, note 26, par. 44 [emphasis added]. The second element 
being “that this support had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime”. See 
also Tadić Appeal, supra, note 8, par. 229.
89. Rome Statute, supra, note 2 [emphasis added]. See interesting remarks on the purpose 
test adopted at Rome in Doug cassel, “Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights 
Violations : Confusion in the Courts”, (2008) 6 Northwestern Journal of International 
Human Rights 304, 310.
90. R. v. Hibbert, supra, note 72, par. 36.
91. G. Werle, supra, note 9, 969 ; R. cryer and others, supra, note 42, p. 312, opine that it 
imposes a higher threshold than knowledge and raise the interesting issue of whether art. 
25 (3) (c) of the Rome Statute requires proof of motive. In Canadian law, the motive of 
accomplices is irrelevant : R. v. Greyeyes, supra, note 56, par. 39 ; R. v. Hibbert, supra, 
note 72, par. 29 ff.
92. This is clear in Canadian law where aiding and abetting requires specific intention : R. v. 
Roach (2004), 192 C.C.C. (3d) 557 (Ont. C.A.) ; see also D. stuart, supra, note 72, p. 637 ; 
G. côté-HarPer, P. rainville and J. turGeon, supra, note 20, p. 793 ; E. colvin and S. 
ananD, supra, note 71, p. 568. As noted above, recklessness was accepted as sufficient 
for counselling (which arguably overlaps with abetting) in R. v. Hamilton, supra, note 72. 
This interpretation of art. 25 (3) (c) of the Rome Statute is consonant with the general 
mens rea rule at art. 30, which excludes recklessness.
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he or she is charged with responsibility as an aider and abettor93. The ad 
hoc tribunals have concluded that this includes awareness of the mental 
state of the physical perpetrator94. This requirement of knowledge of the 
physical perpetrator’s intent applies equally to specific­intent crimes or 
underlying offences such as genocide or persecution as a crime against 
humanity95. However, the accomplice need not share the genocidal intent 
of the principal96.
The knowledge­based mens rea in international law for aiding and 
abetting genocide has been criticised by some commentators for failing to 
respect the fundamental characteristic at the heart of the crime of geno­
cide, namely its specific intent97. Others have opined that there is no prac­
tical difference between wilful assistance with subjective knowledge of 
the principal’s intent to destroy a protected group and intention to destroy 
such group98. In light of the above discussion, provided that it is subjec­
tive knowledge at the level of reasonable certainty that is required of the 
accomplice to genocide with respect to the specific intent of the principal, 
93. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, supra, note 87, par. 50 ; Prosecutor v. Simić and others, 
Case no IT­95­9­A, Judgement, 28 November 2006, par. 86 (ICTY – Appeals Chamber) ; 
Tadić Appeal, supra, note 8, par. 229. Note that there has been an apparent conflict in 
the jurisprudence as to whether knowledge needed to be of the precise crime that is 
aided or abetted, or of one of a number of crimes that may be committed. The former 
approach is the one that seems to have gained more support. For Canadian law, see e.g. 
R. v. Yanover (1985), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 300, 329 (Ont. C.A.) ; R. v. Roach, supra, note 92, 
574.
94. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case no IT­95­14/1­A, Judgement, 24 March 2000, par. 162 
(ICTY – Appeals Chamber) ; Prosecutor v. Simić and others, supra, note 93, par. 86.
95. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case no IT­98­33­A, Judgement, 19 April 2004, par. 140 
(ICTY – Appeals Chamber) ; Prosecutor v. Furundžija, supra, note 58, par. 236, 252, 257 ; 
Prosecutor v. Milutinović and others, supra, note 66, par. 94.
96. Prosecutor v. Simić and others, supra, note 93, par. 86 ; Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, 
Case no IT­02­60­A, Judgement, 9 May 2007, par. 127 (ICTY – Appeals Chamber) ; Pros-
ecutor v. Seromba, supra, note 26, par. 56. There is no need to enter here into the early 
debates before the ad hoc tribunals concerning the notion of “complicity” to commit 
genocide, which is included in the Genocide Convention and which was replicated in the 
ad hoc tribunals statutes, and “aiding and abetting”, which is a form of participation in 
all core crimes including genocide under the same statutes. The Rome Statute does not 
provide for a distinct principle of liability of complicity for genocide. Therefore, s. 25 (3) 
(c), the general provision on assistance, will apply to all core crimes including genocide.
97. See Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2005, p. 212 ff., 286 ff. Contra : G. Werle, supra, note 9, 969­970.
98. William A. scHaBas, Genocide in International Law. The Crimes of Crimes, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 302­303, where he also warns of possible confusion 
between intent and motive. On the difference between intent to assist and intent to see 
the crime committed, an interesting parallel can be made with Charron J.’s remarks on 
counselling in R. v. Hamilton, supra, note 72, par. 77 and 80.
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there is indeed no effective difference with requiring that he or she share 
that intent.
Despite the standard for murder adopted in Kirkness99, the interna­
tional wording should be adopted in Canada for genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. Framing the requisite intent in terms of subjec­
tive knowledge of the principal’s specific intent (at the level of reasonable 
certainty) keeps close track with the reality of assistance to the worst crimes, 
while yielding effectively the same result as requiring that the accomplice 
share that intent. Furthermore, any debate as to whether the accomplice is 
held to a lower form of mens rea than the principal (knowledge vs. specific 
intent) becomes less relevant in the Canadian context, where the specific 
intention to assist or to encourage is always a requirement for aiding or 
abetting. This specific intent, coupled with subjective knowledge of the 
principal’s specific intent at the level of reasonable certainty, creates no 
asymmetry in the requisite mens rea of the accomplice and that of the 
principal.
There is therefore relative consistency of the applicable principles 
in both legal systems regarding accomplice liability. However, Canadian 
courts, like their international counterparts, will be faced with the lingering 
difficulty of establishing individual criminal responsibility in the context of 
collective criminality. For instance, is the criminal liability of a high­ranking 
official adequately captured by the current interpretation of aiding and 
abetting ? Can or should the liability of a president who masterminds the 
commission of massive and systematic crimes be determined according to 
whether he or she “intended to assist” in the commission of those crimes ? 
Clearly, his or her intent and actual role in the execution of the crimes goes 
beyond what is traditionally understood as accomplice liability. Further­
more, aiding and abetting is built around the idea that the material element 
of complicity is intrinsically linked to the material element of the impugned 
offence100. Though the material element requirement for aiding and abet­
ting is relatively easy to establish — a few words of encouragement will 
suffice for abetting, for instance —, it remains closely related to the actual 
 99. R. v. Kirkness, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 74, 88, par. 20 : “the requisite intent that the aider or abettor 
must have in order to warrant a conviction for murder must be the same as that required 
of the person who actually does the killing. That is to say, the person aiding or abetting 
the crime must intend that death ensue or intend that he or the perpetrator cause bodily 
harm of a kind likely to result in death and be reckless whether death ensues or not.”
100. G. côté-HarPer, P. rainville and J. turGeon, supra, note 20, p. 767, citing Wilson 
J.’s dissent in R. v. Kirkness, supra, note 99, 97.
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crime that was aided or abetted101. However, an accused’s contribution 
to international crimes may be quite remote from the principal’s (material 
perpetrator’s) actions. Aiding and abetting under section 21 (1) (b) and (c) 
must be interpreted so as to cover adequately the various types of partici­
pation in large collective enterprises leading to massive crimes.
The ad hoc tribunals have gone to great lengths in attempting to 
establish individual responsibility in that context. They have developed 
the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise in response to the observation 
that the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
frequently occur through the implication of a plurality of persons, some of 
whom remain at a distance from the actual perpetrators102. The doctrine has 
indeed served as a basis for a large proportion of the convictions entered 
by the ad hoc tribunals103. The Rome Statute has not espoused the doctrine 
of joint criminal enterprise to its full extent. However, to respond to the 
same concerns and with comparable results, it adopts, as we have seen, a 
broad definition of principal liability through an expansive interpretation 
of co­perpetration and an innovative concept of perpetration­by­means. 
With these recent developments in mind, the following analysis of the joint 
criminal enterprise doctrine will allow us to assess whether and how aiding 
and abetting in Canadian criminal law can respond specifically to the reality 
of collective mass criminality. 
2.2.2 Joint Criminal Enterprise
The recognition as part of international customary law104 of the joint 
criminal enterprise doctrine within principal liability105 has been the object 
of substantial academic and jurisprudential debate. The leading judgment 
is once again the Tadić Appeal. In that case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
identified three classes of cases where liability arising from a common 
101. This link with the crime committed is required even if the aiding or abetting does not 
need to have any material effect on the commission of the crime. It is also necessary 
even if the accomplice can be found liable while the principal is acquitted, found non­
responsible or is unknown : s. 23.1 of the Criminal Code.
102. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case no IT­00­39­A, Judgement, 17 March 2009, par. 
663 (ICTY – Appeals Chamber).
103. G. Boas, J.L. BiscHoFF and N.L. reiD, supra, note 15, p. 8­9.
104. Tadić Appeal, supra, note 8, par. 195­219 (partly basing this finding on art. 25 (3) (d) of 
the Rome Statute, which however only covers limited aspects of the doctrine developed 
in Tadić) ; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, supra, note 102, par. 658.
105. Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, supra, note 66, par. 102 ; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case no IT­97­
25­A, Judgement, 17 September 2003, par. 73 (ICTY – Appeals Chamber) (overruling the 
Trial Chamber’s holding that joint criminal enterprise is a form of accomplice liability) ; 
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, supra, note 102, par. 662­666.
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purpose might arise. These categories have come to be labelled basic joint 
criminal enterprise (JCE 1), systemic joint criminal enterprise (JCE 2 ; the 
concentration camp cases) and extended joint criminal enterprise (JCE 
3)106. The actus reus was said to be common to all three types of joint 
criminal enterprise :
i. A plurality of persons. They need not be organised in a military, political or 
administrative structure […]
ii. The existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or 
involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute. There is no neces­
sity for this plan, design or purpose to have been previously arranged or formu­
lated. The common plan or purpose may materialise extemporaneously and be 
inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons acts in unison to put into effect 
a joint criminal enterprise.
iii. Participation of the accused in the common design involving the perpetra­
tion of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. This participation need not 
involve commission of a specific crime under one of those provisions (for example, 
murder, extermination, torture, rape, etc.), but may take the form of assistance in, 
or contribution to, the execution of the common plan or purpose107.
Later cases contributed in clarifying the nature of the actus reus. For 
our purposes, suffice it to note the following :
1) Membership in the group having a common criminal purpose is not 
sufficient per se108. There is no guilt by “mere association”109.
2) The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise is not restricted to small­
scale cases and can apply to large criminal enterprises110. Further­
more, “[w]hile a Trial Chamber must identify the plurality of persons 
belonging to the JCE, it is not necessary to identify by name each of 
the persons involved. Depending on the circumstances of the case, it 
can be sufficient to refer to categories or groups of persons111.”
3) The accused need not have performed any part of the actus reus of 
the perpetrated crime112. The contribution of the accused need not 
106. Tadić Appeal, supra, note 8, par. 220.
107. Id., par. 227.
108. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic´ and others, supra, note 66, par. 26 ; Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case 
no IT­99­36­T, Judgement, 1 September 2004, par. 263 (ICTY – Trial Chamber) ; Pros-
ecutor v. Krajišnik, supra, note 102, par. 19­21 (separate opinion of Shahabuddeen J.).
109. Prosecutor v. Brđanin, supra, note 58, par. 424.
110. Id., par. 425 ; Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera, Cases nos 98­44­
AR72.5 and 98­44­AR72.6, Decision on Jurisdictional Appeals : Joint Criminal Enter­
prise, 12 April 2006, par. 11­18 (ICTR – Appeals Chamber).
111. Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, supra, note 102, par. 156.
112. Prosecutor v. Brđanin, supra, note 58, par. 427 ; Prosecutor v. Kvočka and others, supra, 
note 70, par. 99.
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be necessary or substantial, but some chambers have affirmed that it 
should at least be a significant contribution to the common criminal 
purpose113. Several factors may serve to evaluate the level of partici­
pation, such as the accused’s position of authority, efforts made to 
impede the effective functioning of the system, etc.114 Causation is 
irrelevant115.
4) If the plan fundamentally changes, the accused is only liable for the 
crimes which related to the original plan to which he had subscribed116. 
However, a joint criminal enterprise can come to embrace expanded 
criminal means (additional crimes not originally encompassed in the 
joint criminal enterprise), as long as the evidence shows that the 
members agreed (explicitly or not) on this expansion of means to 
achieve the common objective117. 
5) The actual perpetrator need not be a party to the common purpose. 
Members of a joint criminal enterprise can incur liability for crimes 
committed by principal perpetrators who were non­members of the 
enterprise, provided that it has been established that the crimes can 
be imputed to at least one member of the enterprise and that this 
member — when using the principal perpetrators — acted in accor­
dance with the common objective118.
Following Tadić, the level of mens rea changes according to the cate­
gory of joint criminal enterprise which is concerned :
With regard to the first category, what is required is the intent to perpetrate a 
certain crime (this being the shared intent on the part of all co­perpetrators). With 
regard to the second category (which, as noted above, is really a variant of the first), 
113. Prosecutor v. Brđanin, supra, note 58, par. 430.
114. Prosecutor v. Kvočka and others, Case no IT­98­30/1­T, Judgement, 2 November 2001, 
par. 311 (ICTY – Trial Chamber). The Appeals Chamber did not reverse this position, but 
it held that an accused’s position is not determinative in itself and is only one factor to 
take into account to assess the level of participation : Prosecutor v. Kvočka and others, 
supra, note 70, par. 101.
115. Tadić Appeal, supra, note 8, par. 199.
116. Prosecutor v. Blagosević and Jokić, Case no IT­02­60­T, Judgement, 17 January 2005, 
par. 700­701 (ICTY – Trial Chamber). But see comments of R. cryer and others, supra, 
note 42, p. 307.
117. Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, supra, note 102, par. 163.
118. Prosecutor v. Brđanin, supra, note 58, par. 413. See also Prosecutor v. Martić, Case 
no IT­95­11­A, Judgement, 8 October 2008, par. 168 (ICTY – Appeals Chamber) ; Pros-
ecutor v. Krajišnik, supra, note 102, par. 225. This covers situations where a member of 
the joint criminal enterprise uses a perpetrator outside the group to achieve the common 
purpose. This resembles co­perpetration through another person as developed by the 
ICC Pre­Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, supra, note 10, 
par. 491, discussed above.
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personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment is required (whether proved by 
express testimony or a matter of reasonable inference from the accused’s position 
of authority), as well as the intent to further this common concerted system of 
ill­treatment. With regard to the third category, what is required is the intention to 
participate in and further the criminal activity or the criminal purpose of a group 
and to contribute to the joint criminal enterprise or in any event to the commission 
of a crime by the group. In addition, responsibility for a crime other than the one 
agreed upon in the common plan arises only if, under the circumstances of the 
case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or other 
members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk119.
Despite the use of the term “foreseeable”, rather than “foreseen”, which 
hints at a requirement of objective liability, the Chamber made clear that 
in the third category of joint criminal enterprise, “more than negligence is 
required. What is required is a state of mind in which a person, although he 
did not intend to bring about a certain result, was aware that the actions of 
the group were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless willingly 
took that risk. In other words, the so­called dolus eventualis is required 
(also called ‘advertent recklessness’ in some national legal systems)120.” 
This passage nevertheless opens the door to criminal liability for geno­
cide on the basis of recklessness, contrary to the specific intent normally 
required for this crime121, an issue to which we will return below.
As mentioned, the Rome Statute does not explicitly provide for joint 
criminal enterprise. Article 25 (3) (d) contemplates a “residual” form of 
liability for crimes committed by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose122. It envisages a form of accomplice liability, rather than principal 
liability as the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise was construed by the 
tribunals123. It reads :
[A] person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person […]
119. Tadić Appeal, supra, note 8, par. 228 [emphasis added].
120. Id., par. 220. See also Prosecutor v. Kvočka and others, supra, note 70, par. 86. Recent 
cases have however used language more akin to negligence : see e.g. Prosecutor v. 
Milutinović and others, supra, note 66, par. 111 : “that it has to be reasonably foresee­
able on the basis of the information available to the accused that the crime or underlying 
offence would be committed”. The jurisprudence is inconsistent and most post­Tadić 
cases seem to require both objective and subjective foresight : see discussion in G. Boas, 
J.L. BiscHoFF and N.L. reiD, supra, note 15, p. 73­83.
121. Note that for the “systemic”, second category, joint criminal enterprises, Appeals Cham­
bers have held that the accused must have the specific intent required for persecution 
and genocide : Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, supra, note 105, par. 111 ; Prosecutor v. Kvočka 
and others, supra, note 70, par. 110.
122. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra, note 19, par. 337.
123. Id., par. 320.
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(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of 
such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribu­
tion shall be intentional and shall either :
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose 
of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court ; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime 
[emphasis added].
The first category of joint criminal enterprise is clearly encompassed 
by the interpretation given to co­perpetration in Lubanga124. The second 
type could possibly be encompassed by article 25 (3) (d). However, the 
Statute probably does not cover the extended liability for crimes not 
initially contemplated in the common criminal design. The Lubanga confir­
mation of charges decision125 and the general provision on mens rea found 
at article 30 of the Rome Statute, which excludes recklessness, prevent 
an interpretation of any paragraph under article 25 (3) in a manner akin 
to the third category of joint criminal enterprise liability as construed by 
the ad hoc tribunals126. Interestingly, though, article 25 (3) (d) (i) refers 
to intent to contribute to the common purpose of a group which involves 
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court127. Arguably, 
and paraphrasing article 30 (2) of the Rome Statute, should it be established 
that the accused was subjectively aware that the additional offences would 
(certainly or almost certainly) occur in the ordinary course of events, the 
intentional requirement would be satisfied. The Rome Statute thus probably 
excludes only the “outer limits of type three joint criminal enterprise”128.
In light of the above discussion, let us look at a particular provision of 
the Criminal Code which extends the liability of an accomplice to crimes 
that were committed as part of a common criminal purpose. Section 21 (2) 
reads :
(2) Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an 
unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of them, in carrying 
out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew or ought to 
124. See discussion in Stakić Trial, supra, note 25, par. 441.
125. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra, note 19, par. 335.
126. But see G. Boas, J.L. BiscHoFF and N.L. reiD, supra, note 15, p. 128, who argue, essen­
tially, that art. 30 does not apply to art. 25 (3) (d) of the Rome Statute.
127. Par. (ii) requires knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime. Interest­
ingly, such contribution to a group crime is based on a “knowledge” test, arguably lower 
than the “purpose” test of aiding and abetting under art. 25 (3) (c) of the Rome Statute : 
see comments in, e.g., D. cassel, supra, note 89, 313.
128. R. cryer and others, supra, note 42, p. 309.
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have known that the commission of the offence would be a probable consequence 
of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence.
A cursory glance at this provision suffices to notice a certain resem­
blance with the third category of joint criminal enterprise developed by 
the ad hoc tribunals, which also provides for extended liability for addi­
tional offences arising out of a common purpose. Unsurprisingly, both 
doctrines have been criticized for imposing a sort of vicarious liability, and 
for violating the presumption of innocence by diminishing the minimum 
level of mens rea for crimes which require specific intent for principals. 
Still, there exist noteworthy differences between the two doctrines.
For our purposes here, three points will be stressed regarding section 
21 (2) and the manner in which it could operate in the context of prosecu­
tions for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Canada. 
First, section 21 (2) only applies to additional offences which were not 
agreed to between the participants in the joint criminal enterprise129. Thus 
section 21 (2) cannot serve to capture joint criminal enterprises identified 
by the ad hoc tribunals of the first and second categories.
Second, it seems that the requirement of a common illegal design is 
more stringent in Canadian law than it is under the international joint 
criminal enterprise doctrine. Indeed, as noted above, in international law 
there is no need for the plan, design or purpose to have been previously 
arranged or formulated. It can materialise extemporaneously130. In Canada, 
the temporal element of the common purpose is not fully settled, but argu­
ably, the wording of the provision, which, in French, imposes the existence 
of a “projet”, as well as some judicial interpretations, point towards the 
need for the criminal purpose to have been formed prior to the commis­
sion of the crime131. It would thus exclude spontaneous group violence132.
A related point should be noted concerning the requirement of a 
common purpose : section 21 (2) requires that two or more persons “form 
an intention in common to carry out an unlawful purpose” (“forment 
129. R. v. Simpson, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 3, 15, par. 14 : “the unlawful purpose mentioned in s. 21(2) 
must be different from the offence which is actually charged”.
130. See Tadić Appeal, supra, note 8, par. 227 ; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, supra, note 102, par. 
163, footnote 418 and references cited therein, and par. 184.
131. See the discussion on this issue in Pierre rainville, “La responsabilité par appartenance 
ou les incertitudes conceptuelles et constitutionnelles portant sur l’article 21 (2) C.cr.”, 
(2008) 12 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 161, 208­211, including his review of the Canadian 
jurisprudence.
132. See e.g. R. v. Myerscough (2001), 77 W.C.B. (2d) 429, par. 19 (Ont. C.A.), [2001] O.J. no 
2867 (ql/ln). Contra : in international criminal law, see Prosecutor v. Milutinović and 
others, supra, note 66, par. 102.
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ensemble”). This requirement, added to the necessity that there be inten­
tion mutually to assist each other in the commission of the offence, implies 
that the participants to the criminal enterprise must be identifiable, and 
must include the actual perpetrator(s). This requirement effectively shields 
leaders of criminal organisations, who are usually more remote from the 
principal133. It also prevents application of the doctrine to large criminal 
enterprises where full membership is difficult to establish. The difficulty 
in applying section 21 (2) in such cases is not linked to the leader’s inten­
tion to carry out an unlawful purpose or even to assist therein134, but to 
the requirement that such intention was actually formed in common with 
the main perpetrator. The jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is much 
less stringent in this regard. First, the doctrine is now probably applicable 
to large joint criminal enterprises135 and it is not necessary to establish 
precisely the membership of the joint criminal enterprise136. Secondly, 
recent developments impose liability on members even if the main perpe­
trator is not part of the joint criminal enterprise. As already noted, there 
is no need for an understanding or agreement to commit a particular crime 
between the accused and the principal perpetrator137. It would be difficult, 
as it is currently interpreted, to allow such an extension of the common 
purpose at section 21 (2)138. This is probably a good thing. The broad reach 
of the third category of joint criminal enterprise as interpreted by the ad hoc 
tribunals is one of the most criticised aspects of international criminal law, 
as is evidenced by the explicit exclusion of its outer limits in the Rome 
Statute.
Our third remark is concerned with the level of mens rea required of 
the accomplice for the extended liability to arise under section 21 (2) of 
the Criminal Code for international offences proscribed by the War Crimes 
Act. Liability for offences other than those agreed to in the common plan 
will be restricted in Canada to offences actually foreseen by the accused. 
Subjective foresight of the additional offences will be required. Indeed, 
133. G. côté-HarPer, P. rainville and J. turGeon, supra, note 20, p. 850.
134. The assistance in the common illegal design can be intended to apply at the planning 
stage rather than during the actual perpetration : R. v. Moore (1984), 15 C.C.C. (3d) 541 
(Ont. C.A.).
135. Prosecutor v. Milutinović and others, supra, note 66, par. 98, citing Prosecutor v. Kare-
mera, Ngirumpatse, and Nzirorera, supra, note 110, par. 15­16.
136. Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, supra, note 102, par. 184.
137. Prosecutor v. Brđanin, supra, note 58, par. 418 (reversing the Trial Chamber on this 
particular point).
138. The possibility that the main perpetrator not be part of the common enterprise is clearly 
excluded by the wording of s. 21 (2) of the Criminal Code, which requires that it be “any 
one of them” who “commits” the additional offence.
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the Supreme Court of Canada has decided that a few offences require 
a special degree of mens rea by reason mainly of the social stigma that 
attaches to conviction for those offences. These offences include murder139, 
attempted murder140 and crimes against humanity and war crimes141. For 
these offences, subjective mens rea will be required as a principle of funda­
mental justice. Importantly, “that minimum degree of mens rea is constitu­
tionally required to convict a party to that offence as well”142. The words 
“ought to have known” are thus to be deleted where section 21 (2) is applied 
to the international crimes contemplated by the Act.
Surprisingly very little has been said about what is meant by “subjec­
tive” foresight as the constitutionally­required mens rea for certain offences. 
Generally, “subjective” mens rea comprises both intention and reckless­
ness143. With respect to murder, the constitutional minimum was described 
as intent to cause death or intent to cause bodily harm that the accused knows 
will likely cause death144. As mentioned above, while there is an element 
of “likelihood” which tracks closely the usual description of recklessness, 
it was held that the intent to cause bodily harm that is known will likely 
cause death was only a “slight relaxation” and quasi­identical to the intent 
139. R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633. Obiter in this judgement as well as in R. v. Vail-
lancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 indicate that theft would also require subjective mens rea.
140. R. v. Logan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 731.
141. R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701. Note that the essence of the justification given by the 
majority in Finta to require subjective mens rea has lost its relevance in Canadian law 
following the coming into force of the War Crimes Act and the reformulation of the 
applicable law by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citi-
zenship and Immigration), supra, note 16. Indeed, this conclusion was taken in a context 
where the Court felt justified to “elevate” crimes against humanity or war crimes so as to 
differentiate the moral blameworthiness of the accused from the crimes for which he was 
really charged, i.e. the common domestic offences such as manslaughter, confinement 
or robbery. Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are now criminalised 
as such under Canadian law and there is no justification for any “further measure of 
blameworthiness” (R. v. Finta, par. 187). However, there is little doubt that the gravity 
and stigma attached to the crimes, as well as the severity of the related sentences, would 
justify a similar conclusion as that reached by the Court in Finta regarding the minimum 
constitutional requirement. This was affirmed in Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citi-
zenship and Immigration), supra, note 16, par. 176 (though the constitutional basis for 
the requirement of subjective knowledge was not explicitly reaffirmed).
142. R. v. Logan, supra, note 140, 742, par. 16. For a cogent critique of the limited scope of 
this decision, see P. rainville, supra, note 131.
143. R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 1303.
144. R. v. Martineau, supra, note 139.
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to kill145. A particularly high level of recklessness is thus required, so that 
awareness of a risk or of a possibility of death is excluded in the case of 
murder146. Attempted murder requires intent to kill and therefore satis­
fies the constitutional requirement of subjective foresight147. As concerns 
crimes against humanity, the subjective criterion adopted in Finta was 
rearticulated in Mugesera in accordance with customary international law 
(though the constitutional basis was not explicitly reaffirmed). Most inter­
estingly, it explicitly includes recklessness :
[I]n addition to the mens rea for the underlying act, the accused must have knowl­
edge of the attack and must know that his or her acts comprise part of it or take the 
risk that his or her acts will comprise part of it […] The person need not intend that 
the act be directed against the targeted population, and motive is irrelevant once 
knowledge of the attack has been established together with knowledge that the 
act forms a part of the attack or with recklessness in this regard […] In Finta, the 
majority of this Court found that subjective knowledge on the part of the accused 
of the circumstances rendering his or her actions a crime against humanity was 
required. This remains true in the sense that the accused must have knowledge 
of the attack and must know that his or her acts are part of the attack, or at least 
take the risk that they are part of the attack148.
Therefore, it seems that the minimal constitutional requirement of 
subjective foresight may include recklessness, with different levels of 
awareness of the risk depending on the offence at play. The constitution­
ally required subjective mental element of crimes against humanity includes 
recklessness, according to the Supreme Court of Canada149. The rationale 
145. R. v. Cooper, supra, note 84. As noted above, the reference to recklessness in s. 229 
(a) (ii) was described as an “afterthought” in R. v. Nygaard, [1989] 2 S.C.R 1074, 1088, 
par. 29 : “The essential element is that of intending to cause bodily harm of such a grave 
and serious nature that the accused knew that it was likely to result in the death of the 
victim. The aspect of recklessness is almost an afterthought in so far as the basic intent 
is concerned.”
146. See a critique of the reference to recklessness in this section in K. roacH, supra, note 
79, p. 350­351. Interestingly, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY has accepted that “both a 
dolus directus and a dolus eventualis are sufficient to establish the crime of murder”. 
It concluded that “if the killing is committed with ‘manifest indifference to the value of 
human life’, even conduct of minimal risk can qualify as intentional homicide” : Stakić 
Trial, supra, note 25, par. 587.
147. R. v. Logan, supra, note 140, referring to R. v. Ancio, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 225.
148. Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), supra, note 16, par. 173, 
174 and 176 [emphasis added].
149. Although it is not the place to discuss this issue in detail, it should be noted that the 
mens rea standard adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada for crimes against humanity, 
which includes recklessness as per the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, is at odds 
with art. 30 of the Rome Statute, which, as noted above, excludes recklessness as a 
general rule. Knowledge is defined thus at art. 30 (3) : “‘knowledge’ means awareness 
that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events” 
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would likely extend to war crimes, which also require that the perpetrator 
“was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an 
armed conflict150”. However, the crime of genocide, which is characterised 
by the specific intent “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such151”, would likely preclude recklessness, 
though the question as to the constitutional minimum remains open. Obvi­
ously, murder can constitute an underlying offence of all core international 
crimes. In such cases, a “lower form” of recklessness (awareness of a risk) 
would be excluded for the underlying offence but permitted for the required 
knowledge of the contextual elements (attack or armed conflict) that qualify 
the crime as a crime against humanity or a war crime.
What is the situation of an accomplice under section 21 (2) with respect 
to the different levels of subjective mens rea required of the principal as 
a constitutional minimum ? In Logan, Lamer C.J. decided that “[w]hen 
the principles of fundamental justice require subjective foresight in order 
to convict a principal of attempted murder, that same minimum degree of 
mens rea is constitutionally required to convict a party to the offence of 
attempted murder152.” Consequently, the Supreme Court of Canada declared 
unconstitutional, in such cases, the objective component of section 21 (2)153. 
However, it did not reject any other wording of that provision and maintained 
[emphasis added]. As the core crimes in the War Crimes Act are defined in accordance 
with international customary law, it remains to be seen whether the Rome Statute will 
change the state of the law as it was interpreted by the ad hoc tribunals and which has 
been made part of Canadian law in Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), supra, note 16.
150. See international criMinal court, Elements of Crimes, Doc. off. ICC­ASP/1/3 (part 
II­B) (9 September 2002), art. 8. The introduction specifies that that is implicit in the 
requirement that the “conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
[…] armed conflict”. The decision in R. v. Finta, supra, note 141, included both war 
crimes and crimes against humanity as requiring subjective foresight as a constitutional 
minimum, but Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), supra, 
note 16, was only concerned with crimes against humanity.
151. Art. 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
9 December 1948, (1951) 78 UNTS 277 [hereinafter “Genocide Convention”] ; art. 6 of the 
Rome Statute. Note that ss. 4 (3) and 6 (3) of the War Crimes Act, supra, note 1, read : 
“with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an identifiable group of persons, as such” 
[emphasis added], thereby opening the door to a more expansive interpretation of the 
crime.
152. R. v. Logan, supra, note 140, 745, par. 24 [emphasis added].
153. Id. : “To the extent that s. 21 (2) would allow for the conviction of a party to the offence 
of attempted murder on the basis of objective foreseeability, its operation restricts s. 7 
of the Charter.”
3097 vol_50#3-4_sept-dec09.indd   1003 10-02-19   12:36
1004 Les Cahiers de Droit (2009) 50 C. de D. 967
the subjective foreseeability to the level of probability154. Therefore, reckless­
ness — with a high degree of consciousness — would appear as sufficient 
mens rea for liability to arise under section 21 (2), including for specific­
intent crimes such as attempted murder155 and, arguably, genocide. This 
conclusion converges with certain decisions of the ICTY which have held 
that the additional offences must have been foreseen as “likely” or “most 
likely”, though most ICTY cases state a lower standard of awareness by 
referring to a “possibility” of occurrence156.
As noted above, extended liability of the participant in a joint criminal 
enterprise on the basis of recklessness for genocide and other specific­
intent crimes has been criticised. In Canada, the softening of the mens 
rea requirement for the participant in a joint criminal enterprise may be 
justified insofar as the law requires that he or she be subjectively aware 
of the specific intention of the principal157. The degree of likelihood of the 
additional offence, explicitly set at section 21 (2) to a probability and not 
merely a possibility, also imposes a high threshold for the reckless conduct 
to attract criminal sanction. Furthermore, it reflects the particular danger 
of criminal groups for the public and the additional moral guilt attached to 
engaging in a joint criminal enterprise that the accused knows will probably 
escalate158. Finally, under section 21 (2), the accomplices will always be 
required to have a specific intent to “carry out an unlawful purpose and to 
assist each other therein”. This specific intent, coupled with the subjective 
foresight of the probability that additional offences be committed, is in the 
end a moderately softened mental element.
However, under that interpretation, the accomplice is still held to a 
lower standard than the principal for the additional specific­intent offences. 
154. Id., 748 : “the remaining section requires, in the context of attempted murder, that the 
party to the common venture know that it is probable that his accomplice would do 
something with the intent to kill in carrying out the common purpose” [emphasis added].
155. See also P. rainville, supra, note 131, 196­197.
156. See cases referred to and analysed in G. Boas, J.L. BiscHoFF and N.L. reiD, supra, note 
15, p. 73­83.
157. R. v. Logan, supra, note 140, 748.
158. See the cogent remarks of P. rainville, supra, note 131, 195­202. Also, Lord Steyn in 
R. v. Powell and Daniels ; R. v. English, [1997] 4 All ER 545 (H.L. (Eng.)) justified the 
reliance on recklessness for the party to a joint criminal enterprise for additional offences 
requiring intent for the principal (murder) on the near impossibility of proving intent of 
accomplices in most cases of joint criminal enterprises and on the importance of the 
social problem of preventing escalation in the execution of common criminal purposes. 
In international criminal law, see the convincing arguments brought forward by Antonio 
cassese, International Criminal Law, 2d ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 
p. 199­205.
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The Supreme Court of Canada has not accepted that “the principles of 
fundamental justice prohibit the conviction of a party to an offence on the 
basis of a lesser degree of mens rea than that required to convict the prin­
cipal”. However, it left open the question whether this proposition could 
be supported “in a situation where the sentence for a particular offence is 
fixed159”. The War Crimes Act mandates a sentence of life imprisonment 
where intentional killing is the basis of the international offence160. This 
could serve as a basis for an argument that an accomplice, who faces the 
same penalty as the principal, should be required to have the same level of 
(subjective) mens rea, which, at least for genocide and other specific intent 
crimes, excludes any form of recklessness161. Admitedly, the Supreme 
Court of Canada pronounced itself in the context of a discussion on the 
objective/subjective dichotomy. Still, its reasoning could be extended to 
apply to an asymmetry in the different degrees of subjective mens rea 
applicable to the accomplice and the principal162. This interpretation is 
supported by the Rome Statute — an interpretative guide for Canadian 
159. R. v. Logan, supra, note 140, 741, par. 14. This issue was left open in Logan, which was 
concerned with attempted murder, which has no fixed sentence (s. 463 (a) of the Criminal 
Code). The same argument could hold true for murder.
160. Ss. 4 (2) (a) and 6 (2) (a) of the War Crimes Act. This is in line with the Criminal Code 
where mandatory life sentence for murder to the first and second degrees is the rule 
(s. 235).
161. The definition of genocide contained in the War Crimes Act reads “with intent to 
destroy”. These words indicate, in Canadian criminal law, crimes of specific intent for 
which recklessness will not suffice : See e.g. E. colvin and S. ananD, supra, note 71, 
p. 182­183. For English common law, see J.C. sMitH and B. HoGan, supra, note 83, 
p. 113. Other offences listed in the Act are defined in international customary law with 
an ulterior mens rea component, including persecution and forced pregnancy as crimes 
against humanity.
162. Pierre Rainville recognises that the imposition of a lower form of mens rea to the accom­
plice where the crime is one of specific intent could violate the principle of presumption 
of innocence, but he opines that it would be justified under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, [enacted as Schedule B 
to the Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)], (which came into force on April 17, 1982) : 
P. rainville, supra, note 131, 201­202. He also quotes numerous authors who have 
criticised this “anomaly”. He notes elsewhere that there is an established rule of Cana­
dian law, though not protected by s. 7 of the Charter as per Logan, which provides that 
the accomplice should not be imposed more stringent liability rules than the principal. 
Though recklessness for the instigator would breach that rule, he argues that the specific 
intent to “carry out an unlawful purpose” required of the accomplice under s. 21 (2) justi­
fies the imposition of a lower level of mens rea for the additional offences : P. rainville, 
supra, note 72, 191.
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judges for prosecutions under the Act — which excludes liability on the 
basis of recklessness as a general rule163.
In closing this discussion, it should be noted that nearly all cases 
in Canada concerning the application of international criminal law have 
emanated from the administrative level, that is from various quasi­judi­
cial bodies or from courts (including the Federal Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court on one occasion) sitting in judicial review of such proceed­
ings. The importance of these decisions can be considerable, as exemplified 
by the Mugesera decision which has influenced profoundly the domestic 
approach to international crimes. “Complicity” in international crimes has 
been the object of an impressive jurisprudence emanating from these fields. 
It is outside the scope of this article to offer a complete review of this rich 
and vast jurisprudence164. However, two points will be stressed. 
First, an analysis of this case law shows that it bears many similari­
ties with the international joint criminal enterprise doctrine, though the 
two “have developed virtually in isolation of each other165”. Both apply to 
large­scale criminal enterprises ; both acknowledge that membership in a 
criminal organisation is not enough (though Canadian bodies have devel­
oped an exception for those organisations limited to a brutal purpose) ; and 
both recognise that the significance of the accused’s contribution need not 
be linked to the actual perpetration of the material elements of an offence 
and can be determined among other things considering “[a]n accused’s 
leadership status and approving silence […] the size of the enterprise, the 
functions performed by the accused and his efficiency in performing them, 
and any efforts made by the accused to impede the efficient functioning of 
163. But see Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra, note 19, par. 352­355, discussed above. Note that 
ss. 4 (3) and 6 (3) of the War Crimes Act, supra, note 1, contain the crimes’ definitions, 
which draw extensively on customary law. Ss. 4 (4) and 6 (4) provide interpretative 
guidance : “[f]or greater certainty, crimes described in articles 6 and 7 and paragraph 2 
of article 8 of the Rome Statute are, as of July 17, 1998, crimes according to customary 
international law”. Principals will see their criminal liability determined according to 
the substantive definitions of crimes under international law (actus reus and mens rea), 
including the minimal mens rea requirements. Participants to a joint criminal enterprise 
could see their liability incurred on a lower standard than under the Rome Statute 
because Canadian law applies to the specific material and mental elements of secondary 
parties.
164. For an interesting comparison of complicity in international criminal law and in Canadian 
refugee law, see Joseph riKHoF, “Complicity in International Criminal Law and Cana­
dian Refugee Law. A Comparison”, (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
702.
165. Id., 719.
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the joint criminal enterprise166”. Second, and consequently, it is apposite 
that an analysis be undertaken as to whether and how Canadian criminal 
law may be inspired by this case law. With respect to complicity, the appli­
cable principles have developed taking into account the collective nature of 
international crimes and were influenced by the “international” character 
of the crimes167.
Summary
In summary, the state of Canadian law on principal liability and 
complicity (excluding counselling), when analysed in conjunction with 
international criminal law, is such that :
1) Commission and co­perpetration (principal liability) will not apply 
to those who participate in the commission of international crimes 
without however executing one of the essential elements of the actus 
reus, thereby excluding an important proportion of participants 
therein and most leaders or masterminds.
2) Aiding and abetting is therefore called to play a crucial role in the 
endeavour of imputing liability at the domestic level for the core inter­
national crimes.
3) Aiding and abetting is in broad terms similar in Canadian and interna­
tional criminal law, but there is no requirement in Canadian law that 
the assistance have a substantial effect on the commission of the crime.
4) Aiding and abetting has a stricter mens rea requirement in Canadian 
law than the knowledge­based mens rea required by the ad hoc tribu­
nals (though the Rome Statute may be interpreted as also requiring 
specific intention).
166. Prosecutor v. Milutinović and others, supra, note 66, par. 105 and references cited 
therein. For Canadian immigration jurisprudence, see e.g. Ramirez v. Canada (Minister 
of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C. 306 (C.A.) ; Sivakumar v. Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.) ; Bazargan v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 67 A.C.W.S. (3d) 132 (F.C.A.), 
[1996] F.C.J. no 1209 (ln/ql) ; Bedoya v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion), 2005 FC 1092, [2005] F.C.J. no 1348 (ln/ql).
167. See e.g. Ramirez v. Canada, supra, note 166. The main rationale for interpreting the 
notion of complicity more broadly than in the Criminal Code does not rest on the fact 
that the evidentiary burden is lighter in immigration and refugee protection proceed­
ings than in a criminal law context, but on the argument that a text founded on an 
international convention mandates an interpretation that goes beyond that given in a 
particular domestic legal system. The lower evidentiary standard has no bearing on the 
legal characterisation of the mode of participation in an offence : see e.g. Moreno v. 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 298, par. 27 (C.A.).
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5) Despite a slightly different standard for murder, Canadian law should 
continue to uphold the general requirement that the aider and abettor 
need not share the intent of the principal. His or her knowledge of 
the intention of the principal, including the latter’s specific intent, will 
suffice. This is in line with international customary law.
6) Aiding and abetting, however, does not easily capture the collective 
nature of international crimes. It does not cover joint criminal enter­
prises of the first and second categories, which are themselves prob­
ably encompassed by the detailed modes of perpetration provided for 
under article 25 (3) (a) or under article 25 (3) (d) of the Rome Statute. 
This could exclude those participants whose role may be essential 
for the realisation of the common criminal design, but who may be 
more difficult to link to a particular crime or to a particular physical 
perpetrator.
7) The extended liability of section 21 (2) — with the applicable Charter 
guarantees — does reflect the collective nature of international crimes. 
It may serve to cover situations akin to those classified under the third 
category of joint criminal enterprises by the ad hoc tribunals, though 
its scope as to the nature of the joint criminal enterprise is — perhaps 
thankfully — narrower. However, the recognition of the collective 
nature of the core crimes applies only to additional offences that 
may have been committed as a probable consequence of the criminal 
design.
Conclusion
Momčilo Krajišnik was a prominent member of the Serbian Demo­
cratic Party (SDS), and President of the Bosnian­Serb Assembly. He was 
found by the ICTY to have been at the center of a joint criminal enterprise, 
the common objective of which was “to ethnically recompose the territories 
under [Bosnian­Serb leadership] control by expelling and thereby drasti­
cally reducing the proportion of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats 
living there”168. Mr Krajišnik’s material contribution to the joint criminal 
enterprise was to “help establish and perpetuate the SDS party and state 
structures that were instrumental to the commission of the crimes. He also 
deployed his political skills both locally and internationally to facilitate 
the implementation of the [joint criminal enterprise’s] common objective 
through the crimes envisaged by that objective169”. For instance, he was 
168. Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case no IT­00­39­T, Judgement, 27 September 2006, par. 1090 
(ICTY – Trial Chamber I).
169. Id., par. 1120.
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found to have “[participated] in the establishment, support or maintenance 
of SDS and Bosnian­Serb government bodies at the Republic, regional, 
municipal, and local levels […] through which [he] could implement the 
objective of the joint criminal enterprise170”. He was also found to have 
supported, encouraged, facilitated or participated in the dissemination of 
information to Bosnian Serbs “that they were in jeopardy of oppression 
at the hands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, that territories on 
which Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats resided were Bosnian­Serb 
land, or that was otherwise intended to engender in Bosnian Serbs’ fear 
and hatred of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats or to otherwise win 
support for and participation in achieving the objective of the joint criminal 
enterprise171”. With the requisite intent, these contributions and compa­
rable others were sufficient for liability to arise for the crimes against 
humanity of deportation and forced transfer, as well as persecution by 
way of deportation and forced transfer, which were the original crimes 
forming the common objective. Central to this determination was the fact 
that “the participation of an accused person in a JCE need not involve the 
commission of a crime, but that it may take the form of assistance in, or 
contribution to, the execution of the common objective or purpose172”.
Could Momčilo Krajišnik have been successfully prosecuted in 
Canada ? What about Omar El­Bashir (regardless of applicable immuni­
ties) ? Could someone who is accused of having directed the branches of 
the state apparatus and led them, in a coordinated manner, to implement 
a joint common plan consisting of ethnic cleansing or unlawful attacks 
against civilians be successfully prosecuted before Canadian courts ?
In the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence and arguably in the detailed 
scheme of article 25 (3) of the Rome Statute, the distinction between prin­
cipal and secondary liability mainly serves to reflect degrees of criminal 
liability173. In Canada, modes of principal and secondary liability mostly 
serve classificatory purposes. Degrees of criminal responsibility are reflected 
at the sentencing level. Hence, a mastermind of massive crimes who can 
only be convicted using secondary liability principles can theoretically 
receive a sentence that adequately reflects the extent of his or her guilt174.
However, a gap in the net cast by the Canadian legal regime may 
be anticipated in cases where the contribution of the accused — mostly 
170. Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, supra, note 102, par. 216.
171. Id., approving the Trial Chamber findings.
172. Id., par. 215.
173. See e.g. G. Werle, supra, note 9.
174. R. v. Logan, supra, note 140.
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leaders and masterminds, but also mid­range perpetrators who will often 
find themselves in a grey zone — will be more difficult to link to the material 
elements of a particular crime. Their role may be essential for the realisa­
tion of the common criminal design, but may, for instance, be harder to 
link to a particular crime of murder or rape. Indeed, this is the fundamental 
distinction between joint criminal enterprise and aiding and abetting at 
international law175.
Reliance on the law governing aiding and abetting in Canada to ensure 
liability for participation in collective crimes yields another unsatisfactory 
consequence. Apart from the extended liability arising from section 21 (2) 
of the Criminal Code, the collective nature of the crime, the existence of 
a plan or the involvement of the accused in an illicit association may not 
be relevant at all when establishing guilt176. Though it may at times facili­
tate the prosecutor’s task (low­level aider or small­scale crimes with few 
participants), it may at other times prevent effective prosecution (mid­level 
participants, masterminds or large­scale criminal enterprises). In some 
cases, it may lead to inadequate results. Indeed, criminal law is usually 
more severe regarding those who associate themselves with illicit organisa­
tions or who take part in group crimes. This is sometimes reflected in the 
gravity of the sentence imposed177, in the very extended liability of section 
21 (2) for additional offences arising out of a joint criminal enterprise, and 
in specific offences which criminalise certain forms of association with 
criminal organisations regardless of the commission of a specific offence178. 
The limited recognition of the reality of group criminality in the law appli­
cable to international offences is unfortunate, both because it effectively 
prevents fair labelling of the impugned offences and participation therein, 
and because it can impact on the perceived gravity of certain conducts 
and on the attached sentences. This is in stark contrast with the principles 
developed by a Pre­Trial Chamber of the ICC in the first decision regarding 
co­perpetration, where the existence of a plan or agreement is essential, as 
well as with the concept of perpetration through a guilty agent, which will 
175. Prosecutor v. Milutinović and others, supra, note 66, par. 103 and references cited 
therein.
176. This is also true of aiding and abetting in international criminal law : see e.g. Prosecutor 
v. Brđanin, supra, note 58, par. 263 ; Prosecutor v. Seromba, supra, note 26, par. 57.
177. For instance, conspiracy is punished much more severely than attempt, though it is 
much further away from any commencement of execution : compare ss. 465 and 463 of 
the Criminal Code. Note that the War Crimes Act provides for the same sentence : see 
above. See also P. rainville, supra, note 131, 223.
178. See e.g. ss. 83.18, 467.1 and 467.11 of the Criminal Code concerning terrorist organisa­
tions and criminal organisations (the latter are defined in part by the receipt of a direct or 
indirect material benefit, including a financial benefit, from the commission of offences).
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often be “organisational” in nature. It is also at odds with the doctrine of 
joint criminal enterprise developed by the ad hoc tribunals. In fact, it is the 
requirement of a plurality of persons sharing a common criminal purpose 
which partly justifies the co­existence of the doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise with other modes of criminal liability179.
Furthermore, while in most cases the use of secondary liability prin­
ciples will not prevent the imposition of individual criminal liability, in 
certain cases it just might do so. Aiders and abetters under Canadian law 
can invoke defences that are not available, or available to a lesser extent, 
to the principal. For instance, an accomplice could theoretically invoke a 
defence of voluntary intoxication not similarly available, if at all, to the 
principal180. Therefore, the “indirect perpetrator” accused of international 
crimes in Canada will at times be subject to a less stringent legal regime 
than if he were considered a principal, or if his or her participation in a 
criminal enterprise were recognised. It should be noted that while this 
may create a more favourable regime for an accused under Canadian law, 
it is another issue whether this leads to “incapacity” in terms of the ICC 
complementarity scheme. Indeed, the same defence may also be available 
before the ICC, regardless of whether the accused is considered a principal 
or an accomplice181.
Within the aiding and abetting regime, apart from extended liability for 
additional offences arising out of a common purpose, liability as an abettor 
for being a party to a conspiracy is an interesting route to explore. It could 
indeed be argued that participation in a conspiracy constitutes encourage­
ment or counselling to commit the crime. In such a scenario, a conspiracy 
179. Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, supra, note 102, par. 662.
180. Since aiding and abetting requires specific intent, the defence of voluntary intoxication 
will be open to the accused, where it will not be available to the principal where the 
crime is one of general intent (and where it contains an element of assault or any other 
interference or threat of interference by a person with the bodily integrity of another 
person) : see s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code and, e.g. the review of jurisprudence and critical 
assessment of E. colvin and S. ananD, supra, note 71, p. 467­473 and 486­498. Note 
that duress may also apply differently to the accomplice than to the principal.
181. This shows the importance of undertaking a careful comparative analysis of defences in 
both systems. For instance, the defence of intoxication in Canada presents at least one 
major difference with that available under the Rome Statute : according to the latter, 
the intoxication must destroy that person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or 
nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform to the 
requirements of law” (art. 31 (b) of the Rome Statute, supra, note 2 [emphasis added]). 
In Canadian law, the conditions are less stringent : the question is not whether the 
accused had the capacity to form the requisite intention, but whether he did form it in 
the circumstances of the case (R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683 ; R. v. Daley, [2007] 
3 S.C.R. 523, 2007 SCC 53).
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would have to be proved, in a similar fashion to common criminal purpose 
under section 21 (2), and liability could be incurred for both conspiracy 
and the substantive crime eventually committed (or only for the latter 
if the merger is seen as unjustified)182. However, for liability to attach to 
a participant in the main crime of genocide, crimes against humanity or 
war crimes, it will always be necessary to meet the conditions of abet­
ting that particular crime (in the scenario under discussion, this would 
involve among other things that the physical perpetrator be a party to the 
conspiracy). In cases such as those of Bashir or Krajišnik and a majority 
of leaders or masterminds party to vast criminal enterprises, such a link 
between the high­level perpetrator, physical perpetrators and identifiable 
crimes on the ground may prove difficult to establish.
In addition to principal liability, aiding, abetting and common purpose, 
which were the central targets of this study, other modes of liability as 
well as inchoate offences will likely be of use in the endeavour of imputing 
liability at the national level for international crimes. Among those, liability 
for conspiracy as a separate inchoate offence offers an alternative for 
prosecutions aiming at reflecting the collective nature of international 
offences. It is an alternative with limited potential, however. First, it is 
unsatisfactory, as liability will then not be incurred for a core crime (geno­
cide, crimes against humanity, war crimes). Furthermore, difficulties may 
arise in prosecutions for conspiracy under the War Crimes Act. Indeed, 
the Act expressly allows prosecution of conspiracy for all core crimes, 
whereas conspiracy is only criminalised for genocide in international law, 
and then again, it is not criminalised as such under the Rome Statute183. 
The prevailing view currently is that “conspiracy does not exist as a form 
of liability for war crimes or crimes against humanity” in international 
customary law184. This discrepancy between Canadian law and interna­
tional law needs to be assessed in light of the principle of legality, enshrined 
in section 11 (g) of the Charter185. It may also serve as a basis for an argu­
ment alleging the (inexistent) basis at international law for the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction over these offences. A constitutional argument 
is indeed conceivable for prosecutions for conspiracy to commit crimes 
against humanity or war crimes, at least those committed prior to the entry 
into force of the War Crimes Act.
182. See D. stuart, supra, note 72, p. 709.
183. Art. 3 (b) of the Genocide Convention, supra, note 151 ; art. 4 (3) (b) of the ICTY Statute, 
supra, note 12 ; art. 2 (3) (b) of the ICTR Statute, supra, note 12.
184. R. cryer and others, supra, note 42, p. 318 and references cited therein. See also A. 
cassese, supra, note 158, p. 227.
185. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra, note 162.
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Moreover, counselling, both as a form of participation in offences and 
as an inchoate offence, will certainly prove crucial in domestic prosecutions 
for international crimes. There, too, a comparative analysis shows that 
Canadian law presents characteristics that may prove difficult to reconcile 
with international criminal law. Nevertheless, section 22 (2) of the Criminal 
Code, which allows for the extended liability of the counsellor for “every 
offence that the other commits in consequence of the counselling” will be 
of particular interest, despite the difficulties inherent in proving a causation 
link and in linking, for instance, a “high­level” counsellor with a “low­level” 
perpetrator.
Courts called upon to apply the Canadian principles of liability in pros­
ecutions under the War Crimes Act should seek guidance in the interna­
tional jurisprudence and, where relevant, the jurisprudence of the Federal 
Court in matters of immigration and refugee law. In these decisions, the 
collective nature of international crimes has influenced the law in a manner 
which may find an echo in the Canadian criminal law context. For instance, 
there is no principled reason why the law on aiding and abetting should 
not be developed so as to encompass contributions to — even large — joint 
criminal enterprises directed at the commission of mass atrocities. The 
accused’s contribution to the core crimes and the requisite intent should 
not be exclusively dependent upon the material elements of a particular 
offence, but should be assessed also considering an accused’s leader­
ship status and role within an organisation or illicit association as well as 
his or her efforts in achieving, or impeding, the objective of the criminal 
purpose. Such an interpretation may be essential if Canadian law is to 
succeed in capturing not only low­level perpetrators — which it does in 
many instances — but also mid­range participants, leaders and masterminds 
of international crimes, particularly in the context of large criminal enter­
prises with a plurality of participants at different levels. Arguably, since the 
material element of aiding and abetting in Canadian law does not require 
that the act or omission of the accused have any effect whatsoever on the 
commission of the crime, and because it is not required that the principal 
even be known, it could be interpreted so as to allow more remote contri­
butions to be considered sufficient, provided the requisite intent is present. 
The War Crimes Act forces Canadian criminal law to evolve and to move 
away from the “mononuclear” paradigm of one author, one fact, one victim.
The inexistence of other modes of participation particularly relevant 
to international crimes, such as planning and ordering, further militates 
for such an interpretation of the law. Liability as a superior for failing to 
prevent or repress the commission of crimes committed by subordinates 
complements the regime on secondary participation in crimes, but will 
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apply to different factual scenarios. Furthermore, superior liability is a 
distinct offence under the Act186 and, in cases of participation in joint 
criminal enterprises, will often not adequately reflect individual criminal 
liability for the core crimes.
The present limited analysis shows that Canadian law can and must 
adapt to the reality of international crimes. The purpose of the system put 
in place by ICC — at the heart of which is the principle of complementa­
rity — is to close the “impunity gap” for genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. In order for this system to function effectively, States 
must be able to exercise their jurisdiction — including universal jurisdic­
tion — against the full range of possible perpetrators, including those at the 
top of military nd political structures (rules on immunity permitting). They 
must also be able to exercise their jurisdiction whatever the complexity 
of the structure of the collective criminal venture giving rise to the worst 
international crimes. Whether this is done through principal or secondary 
liability principles should remain the object of an interesting theoretical 
contest between different legal systems. However, what this legislative 
preference cannot do is create reason for “incapacity”, or a justification 
for “unwillingness”.
186. Ss. 5 and 7 of the War Crimes Act, supra, note 1.
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